Electronics and IT

Aalborg University

http://www.aau.dk

Title:

Decentralized Identity Veriﬁcation Sys-

tem for International Students Aca-

demic Degree Attainment

Theme:

Identity Access Management Using SSI

Concept

Project Period:

10th Oct 2021 - 28th February 2022

Project Group:

Participant(s):

Mohammad Sayeem Chowdhury

Supervisor(s):

Henning Olesen

Copies: 1

Page Numbers: 89

Date of Completion:

February 28, 2022

Abstract:

A school database protects data. Most

of these resources are inaccessible

without interoperability. Students’

opportunities are hampered by lack

of academic control. An open self-

sovereign protocol ﬁeld for students is

proposed. Personal data and identity

control online is enabled by a set of

technology standards and community-

supported concepts. The SSI design

system also gives students more con-

trol over their academic records. SSI

also checks academic records. Its

growing popularity may also help

institutions recruit qualiﬁed interna-

tional students. The veriﬁable creden-

tial has also raised student rights and

privacy awareness. We have always

prioritized user privacy. International

universities beneﬁt from SSI technol-

ogy concepts that expose system ﬂaws.

The SSI system concept can also han-

dle data over-release and record block-

ing. This report addresses the issue by

demonstrating SSI standards and tech-

nologies. Adopt and test ﬁndings af-

ter considering speciﬁc principles and

technologies. This report will also look

into individual data control. Individu-

als and users refer to students seeking

an internationally recognized degree.

The content of this report is freely available, but publication (with reference) may only be pursued due to

agreement with the author.

Contents

1 Introduction 3

1.1 Report Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.2 A Synopsis of the Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1.3 Scenarios as a Tool for Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.4 Classiﬁcation of forgeries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.5 Reputational damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.6 Complications in the global veriﬁcation system . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.7 Forgeries: Internal and External . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.8 Lack of trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1.9 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1.10 Delimitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1.11 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1.11.1 Research Developments: Requirement Speciﬁcation . . . . . . 13

2 Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age 15

2.1 Identity management issues in the digital age . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.2 Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2.3 Digital identity management development phases . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2.3.1 Centralized identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2.3.2 User-oriented identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.3.3 Federated identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2.3.4 Self-Sovereign Identity: a new way to manage identity. . . . . 22

3 State of Art: Recent Developments 27

3.1 Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foun-

dations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3.1.1 Veriﬁable Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3.1.2 Veriﬁable Credential Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.1.3 Veriﬁable Credential Proof Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.1.4 Comparison between Linked data proofs and JSON Web Tokens 32

3.1.5 Advanced proof mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

vi Contents

3.1.6 Zero Knowledge Proof and BBS+ Signatures 2020 Draft Spec-

iﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.1.7 Decentralized Identiﬁers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.1.8 Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3.1.9 DIDComm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

3.1.10 Decentralized Veriﬁable Data Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.1.11 Comparative study of credential hosting services . . . . . . . 39

3.1.12 Privacy-preserving Credential Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.1.13 Digital Wallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4 Questionnaires and Analysis 43

4.1 How SSI can apply to design an IdM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

4.2 Beneﬁts of using SSI for veriﬁcation system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

4.3 Scenario-based SSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.4 Discussions with Experts: Q&A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4.4.1 Questionnaire formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4.4.2 Surveys purpose: Inquiry-based methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

4.4.3 Q&A: Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

4.5 Existing admissions procedures in foreign institutions . . . . . . . . 50

4.6 Expected risk of using existing veriﬁcation system and responses . . 51

4.6.1 Expected Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4.6.2 Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4.6.3 Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4.6.4 Over Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4.6.5 Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

4.6.6 Vendor Lock-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

4.7 Response Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4.7.1 Veriﬁable Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4.7.2 Decentralized Identiﬁers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4.7.3 Decentralized Veriﬁable Data Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4.7.4 Privacy-Preserving Credential Status Check . . . . . . . . . . 57

4.7.5 Personal Data Stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4.7.6 Selective Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4.7.7 Elective Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4.7.8 Progressive Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4.7.9 Embedded Identity Prooﬁng Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4.7.10 Data Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4.7.11 Information Fiduciaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4.7.12 Governance Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4.8 Security Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Contents 1

5 Conceptual Design Proposal 63

5.1 Stage one: Using DID to establish identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

5.2 Stage two: Channel between institution and student . . . . . . . . . . 64

5.3 Stage three: Presenting academic records in credential form . . . . . 66

5.4 SSI’s Functional aspects and interaction between entities . . . . . . . 68

5.5 Setting up Scenario to create conﬁdence between entities . . . . . . . 70

5.6 SSI for Student’s Academic Record System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

6 Conclusion 73

Bibliography 75

A Questionnaires 83

B Experts’ Talk 85

B.1 Conversation with Eva Marie Althoff Schäfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

B.2 Conversation with Mr. Ziarat Hossain Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

B.3 Conversation with Mohammad Tanvir Hossain . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Chapter 1

Introduction

Students’ records are secured within their institution’s proprietary database sys-

tem. The majority of the time, these documents are inaccessible and non-portable

due to the lack of an interoperable standard. Students lack control over their

records and diploma achievement, resulting in less access to utilities, fewer choices,

and diminished equity.

1.1 Report Motivation

The report focuses on developing a management system for verifying interna-

tional students’ domestic degree attainment and on the establishment of a ﬁeld of

open self-sovereign protocols for learners. The term self-sovereign is derived from

self-sovereign identity (SSI) [87], a set of technological standards and community-

supported principles that enable greater online control over an individual’s per-

sonal data and identity [58]. The SSI design system enables institutions to exam-

ine and restructure their existing systems in order to make them more collabora-

tive and interoperable and to give students greater control over their educational

records. Simultaneously, SSI ensures the veracity of the current academic cre-

dential. The increased importance of the SSI system may give students a greater

degree of control over their degree credentials and advance institutional initiatives

for selecting appropriate international students for admission [91]. As a result

of Covid-19, interest in portable, interchangeable, and veriﬁable credentials has

increased signiﬁcantly [66]. Not only that, but the immune credential has also

drawn attention to the importance of adequately protecting students’ privacy and

rights. While SSI is not a panacea for all problems, users’ rights and privacy have

been a primary focus of SSI since its inception [21], [72]. SSI technology concepts

assist by providing critical and valuable insights into system ﬂaws and aid in the

improvement of the veriﬁcation system for students seeking admission to foreign

universities. Not only that, but the SSI system concept can also be sufﬁciently

4 Chapter 1. Introduction

present to address the issue of disclosing more information than necessary and

preventing record tracking [73]. To improve the overall system and mitigate the

associated risk, stakeholders should implement these system concepts and apply

the ICT tools and principles discussed throughout the report.

• A veriﬁable credential is a mechanism that veriﬁes the cryptographical re-

liability of a credential issued by any institution. Institutions or asserting

parties stand behind the statements contained in it and reserve the right to

revoke or suspend the credential’s validity status if necessary.

• Decentralized Identiﬁers: Establishing an identity serves as a conduit be-

tween institutions and students that is free of interference from centralized

parties.

• Privacy-Preserving Credential Status: monitoring the credential’s current

status without disclosing additional information about an individual’s per-

sonal information.

• Selective Disclosure: allows an individual to share only a portion of the

complete information.

• Data Minimization is a technique for requesting the bare minimum amount

of information necessary to complete a transaction.

This report details how implementers and stakeholders can begin utilizing the

technical details of the SSI standards and technologies mentioned previously to

address the problem outlined in the problem formulation. Before applying and

testing for ﬁndings and sharing with the broader SSI community, implementers

of the SSI management system and other stakeholders must consider these prin-

ciples, technologies, and guidance. Additionally, this report will discuss the risks,

opportunities, and community guidance for achieving individual data control. It

is critical to emphasize here that the terms ’individual’ and ’learners’ refer to stu-

dents in the context of this report or to any individual life-long learner attempting

to obtain an internationally recognized degree by simultaneously presenting self-

controlled academic records to multiple institutions, frequently as a learner or as a

career instructor in foreign universities.

1.2 A Synopsis of the Situation

Each year, thousands of international students travel abroad to pursue higher edu-

cation, and they submit educational documents from their home countries through

an application portal. All documents were scanned manually, and the only iden-

tity they verify prior to traveling abroad is the individual’s citizenship via their

1.3. Scenarios as a Tool for Communication 5

passport at the immigration ofﬁces. However, there is no (circle of trust) or Iden-

tity Provider to authenticate students’ accomplishments in support of the relying

party’s assertion that the local educational degree or qualiﬁcation is valid. Ac-

cording to research, the majority of applications from numerous large students are

frequently embellished with extra activities, features, and forgery [88]. As a result,

thousands of international students worldwide are admitted to the renowned uni-

versity and quickly processed through the immigration and admissions systems

based on transcripts, educational records, and recommendation letters from insti-

tutions that lack authenticity. Australia and the United Kingdom are grappling

with admissions fraud and have taken steps to reform the traditional system in re-

cent years [3]. At the moment, the United States of America and Canada are both

dealing with diploma forgery [28]. Another statistic demonstrates that the English

language proﬁciency test score is highly unreliable and utterly useless in some

cases [59]. Additionally, the data indicates that students are willing to pay a high

price, ranging from 20,000 USD for the LSAT required for admission to a US law

school to 60,000 USD for access to an Indian medical school [13], [43]. According

to evidence, it costs $1,000 to provide forged documentation for visa applications

in Canada and Australia [62].

1.3 Scenarios as a Tool for Communication

To help students achieve their goals, this report describes one user scenario that

demonstrates the value of interoperable, individual academic records to various

institutions and job market. The scenario ﬁrst outlines how veriﬁable and interop-

erable academic records can be used to identify meritorious students for domestic

and international admissions. [Figure: 1.1] This facilitates students’ integration

into academic institutions and enables them to establish satisfaction with their de-

gree attainment.

Through the use of scenario it was also demonstrated how students can obtain

employment in both the public and private sectors by presenting these unique

academic records. For employees, it fosters collaboration among coworkers and

accelerates progress toward a more satisfying work experience. Again, it directs

employers’ advance power toward ﬁnding efﬁcient applicants.[Figure: 1.1]

Using the scenario as a guide, this report discusses how SSI initiatives can help

ensure the ongoing veriﬁability of students’ academic records while also empow-

ering them to manage their own data.

1.4 Classiﬁcation of forgeries

The rise of fraud over the last decade can be classiﬁed into four critical factors.

6 Chapter 1. Introduction

Figure 1.1: Using scenarios to portray academic records to third-party stakeholders

• First, the high demand for higher education study spaces creates an imbal-

ance in educational quality, motivating students to increase their chances of

admission to education spaces through illegal means. This behavior is more

visible in the case of international students because it enables them to vali-

date their accomplishments, which motivates them to win the prize.

• Second, as Asia’s and, more recently, Africa’s economies grow, applicants

from populous countries generate high application forgery and admission

behavior rates. And the manner in which fraud is inﬁltrating the mainstream

of international education.

• Third, the widespread availability of web-based tools and content, combined

with the assistance of mobile technology, signiﬁcantly reduces the transac-

tional constraints on fraudulent behavior. Using Photoshop to create papers

that are sold online and used in smartphones for fraud testing and other

wireless technologies encourages students and applicants to commit fraud.

This also raises awareness and prompts institutions and testing agencies to

take countermeasures.

• The ﬁnal and fourth drivers are based on tecit agreements with speciﬁc

stakeholders who place a premium on the economic contribution of inter-

national students over the integrity of their educational proﬁles, admissions

systems, or institutional reputation and brand value. The incentive is reason-

ably self-explanatory - money.

1.5. Reputational damage 7

1.5 Reputational damage

Another critical component is to examine test results for evidence of fraud or fraud-

ulent activity. Those recruited to take the test, deploy technological devices, or

participate in large-scale memorization of illegally obtained test documents, re-

sulting in identity fraud or a breach of the company’s internal testing system. As

a result, language test results in several Asian countries have developed a reputa-

tion for being notoriously inaccurate. Language tests must typically be retaken to

review students once they arrive on campus at most reputable universities. This

list could include anything from cheating in class to manipulating study visas in

order to enter a country solely for the purpose of ﬁnding work [17]. Generally,

the primary motivation for committing fraud outweighs the ordinary penalties. It

is frequently viewed as a necessary act for the purpose of entering speciﬁc coun-

tries. When diploma forgery becomes more prevalent, the long-term consequences

must be considered or addressed. This is because, in the end, the outcome is al-

ways a loss for everyone. To elaborate on that point, students who cheat their way

into foreign programs frequently face an insurmountable amount of work that ex-

ceeds their ability, resulting in unmeasurable and signiﬁcant fraudulent activity

to complete their degree, which is not properly educated. Ultimately, this harms

employers who place a high premium on the quality of speciﬁc programs. Ad-

ditionally, tutors and institutional education providers frequently face challenging

situations when dealing with cases of unequal treatment of students. The latter of

the two causes is rapidly spreading through the media, creating unease among fac-

ulty members due to numerous conﬂicts. Based on anecdotal evidence, employers

frequently respond negatively to international students’ lack of quality during the

task procedure of getting hired. When universities and institutions that provide

statements about students (certiﬁcation or recommendation letter) fail to address

the fraud risk adequately, they frequently put themselves in the position of jeopar-

dizing the brand reputation they built a century ago and continue to build.

1.6 Complications in the global veriﬁcation system

Without any identity providers in most developing nations’ present local educa-

tional system, some testing service providers give additional lip services that com-

promise identiﬁcation and engage in fraudulent conduct, putting them at odds

with the educational system. When educational institutions seek new veriﬁcation

schemes, they overlook these companies’ existing unreliable offerings. If they have

not already done so, local and national education systems will lose their credi-

bility and reputation. Many students sending countries from Africa to Asia have

placed little trust in their portfolios’ legitimacy. On the other hand, Australia and

the United Kingdom were early adopters of complicated policy frameworks to

8 Chapter 1. Introduction

combat visa and immigration fraud [20]. Now, the focus has shifted to Canada’s

and the United States’ governmental and institutional responses [26]. Regrettably,

there is no simple solution to the problem of admissions fraud in the international

educational system. Several facts are associated with it, including the economic

imperative and motive of stakeholders, a loss of control over the handling of tech-

nical measures of fraud, a lack of ICT tools for mapping and measuring fraudulent

activities, an abundance of opportunities for forgery, and cheating on admission

by manipulating existing mechanisms. Previously, speciﬁc actions were taken pe-

riodically. Stakeholders agreed that forgery is the spread of a word, and the failure

to act harms a person’s reputation and merits. It is also applicable to institutions

of higher education that maintain relationships with employers and alumni. Due

to the wide variation in culture and the economic situation between countries and

institutions, a more comprehensive and uniﬁed measure of cross-campus action

is necessary to address the impact of fraud. Additionally, educational institutions

and language test providers must work cooperatively to prevent documentation

forgery and quantify fraudulent activity to design effective countermeasures. With-

out adequate justiﬁcation, there is a risk of admitting a student with insufﬁcient

documentation. Additionally, chances occur as a result of an institution refusing

to accept a student who submits an authentic, ofﬁcial credential. Neither the in-

ternational admissions recruiter nor the academic credential evaluation specialist

wishes to promote or reward academic credential fraud. They must be fair, ethical,

and adhere to sound policies that prohibit the use of deception.

The question that needs to be answered is

• How we can all learn about the international educational system?

• What academic credentials a student receives upon completing secondary

education? or

• How a local student can enroll in a foreign university outside of their coun-

try?

• How would the veriﬁer know what an academic credential looks like in

Mozambique, Bangladesh, or Nepal?

• When the certiﬁcate is presented, what ofﬁcial language does it contain?

• Is the resource current with the educational course being submitted by the

student?

• Has the foreign university established a human resource department and a

global network to assist them in the event of a problem?

1.7. Forgeries: Internal and External 9

1.7 Forgeries: Internal and External

Today, gathering veriﬁable information is critical, but maintaining current and ac-

curate information is more critical than ever. Forgery can occur on both the inter-

nal and external sides.

Dishonest behavior by an internal employee who already possesses a trust iden-

tity from the academic institution occurs on a small to large scale. Even so, when

it occurs, it has a ripple effect throughout the institution. When information about

identity fraud from an institution becomes public, it tarnishes the institution’s good

name. Not only that, but it also jeopardizes the genuine students who have grad-

uated from that institution and are not involved in that heinous activity. Once

one’s reputation has been tarnished, it takes a long time to rebuild the public trust

required to maintain Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with the outside

world and foreign universities. Modiﬁable credentials are available through the in-

ternal admissions ofﬁce. Several examples include the incident at Touro College in

New York City [16]. Numerous academic members accepted bribes from students

to alter their grades and then sold the credential to outsiders under the institution’s

name. Finally, the fraud was reported and the involved students’ and outside buy-

ers’ credentials were revoked. Such incidents in local institutions also result in

signiﬁcant losses for foreign institutions when students or non-students acquire

credentials through other illegal means and are admitted to higher institutions to

obtain a professional degree or to work in the country. Both ways, when forgery

is discovered after the admissions process, the academic year is lost, and foreign

universities do not receive proper students who have the merit and all authentic

credentials to study for higher achievement in their ﬁeld. As a result, many devel-

oping countries annually lose intellectual productivity from their bright students.

Another incident occurred at LA Southern University in Baton Rouge [2]. Students

paid the admissions ofﬁce for eight years to change their grade and educational

history to conform to the application’s requirements. So that they may apply for

admission to a higher degree program at another institution. That incident im-

pacted a total of 2500 individual grades.

External fraud is more common than internal fraud. The fraudster does not re-

quire additional resources such as professional printing equipment to create forged

documents with the aid of internet tools and modern graphics technology. Nowa-

days, the internet enables the creation and printing of a variety of documents for

diploma certiﬁcation and student records while maintaining the institution’s name.

Additionally, some providers send the counterfeit documents in an envelope bear-

ing the institution’s name as the return address, which gives the counterfeit doc-

uments a more authentic appearance. Numerous fraud providers even provide

additional veriﬁcation methods to justify the documentation they provide in order

to ensure its authenticity. Counterfeiters use the name of a local educational in-

10 Chapter 1. Introduction

stitute to offer documentation and records to students and create a website based

on the institution’s information in order to deceive the veriﬁer on a primary level.

Any document, including student records, that is printable can also be modiﬁable

and available for sale. The recent expulsion of a large number of Chinese inter-

national students from Stony Brook University exposed the scam that lures many

students in exchange for a guarantee of admission to the country’s top graduate

schools in exchange for thousands of dollars. According to a Statesman investi-

gation [40], seven students were expelled from Stony Brook University after sub-

mitting a forged transcript with their graduate school application. However, these

students claimed that their records and testimonials were forged without their con-

sent by outside ﬁrms promising to secure their admission to their desired graduate

school. On the contrary, Stony Brook ofﬁcials stated that they had no intention of

investigating outside ﬁrms when students visited them voluntarily. Following that

incident, one of the actions taken was to educate students about academic integrity

and how to avoid becoming vulnerable in a similar situation in the future [15].

Employing consultants to assist with college and university admissions is also

quite common in developing countries. According to a 2011 survey conducted

by the University of Iowa, nearly 87 percent of students from South Asia who

come to the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Australia for

higher education use a consultancy ﬁrm to assist them with their application in

accordance with the university requirements [9]. While many of these consulting

ﬁrms work on behalf of students to provide legitimate services such as matching

students with the appropriate universities based on their proﬁles and scheduling

interviews with admissions ofﬁces. Others obtain the result through deception

and forgery. They prey on students with a lower grade point average and promise

them admission to a top-tier foreign university regardless of whether they meet

the university’s admission requirements [12].

1.8 Lack of trust

Without identity access management, the credentials that a local institution issues

to students for submission to a foreign university must undergo a rigorous exami-

nation process to determine the authenticity of the documents submitted manually

or digitally. Several of these measurements include a check of the degree paper

for that speciﬁc country, a check of the institutional stamps and seals for legiti-

macy, and a check of the time period for the embossed logo on the credentials if

it changes. Other actions include verifying the signatures and seals on the degree

certiﬁcate or recommendation letter and the vocabularies included in the creden-

tial, such as font, text layout presentation, and course title for the speciﬁed time

period. To continue with the existing system’s vulnerabilities, the report will ex-

amine the fundamentals - signed international admission documents and the stu-

1.9. Problem Formulation 11

dent’s educational history — correlating biographical information with statements

included in the educational diploma. Numerous academic credentials include the

complete date of birth and, in some cases, the city of birth of the student, which

can be analyzed to ﬁll in the gaps of unexplained educational history. Addition-

ally, it is critical to justify chronological academic history by ensuring that each

degree or diploma awarded by the local institution follows the standard timeline

for that system. It ﬁlls in any gaps in admission requirements caused by missing

documents. However, trust is the primary issue. For example, understanding the

students’ home institution of study and the basic credential it provides is critical

when admitting an international student to a higher degree program. What is the

authenticity of the institution’s name as it appears on the credential, given that

the institution frequently changes its name? Numerous institutions in the former

Soviet Union, for example, have changed their names. Additionally, many local

institutions in China offer academic credentials that can be translated into English

in various ways, all of which are acceptable in the region.

1.9 Problem Formulation

Learners have no control over their records and have no say over who has access to

their data or when they can access them. There is no mechanism for learners and

issuers to verify their identities online.

Therefore, the problem formulation is as follows:

How to design an identity management system for verifying International Stu-

dents’ domestic educational records submitted to foreign universities, emphasizing

students exercising control over their credentials.

This project aims to describe the technical details of SSI standards and tech-

nologies to contribute to the development of forward-thinking technologies that

protect students’ privacy and control over their personal data records.

This research question has a number of subquestions, which are detailed in

the section that follows. Each of these sub-issues/questions points to a signiﬁcant

location that aids in the formulation of the broader problem. Resolving the central

research question also leads to a better understanding of the issues and problems

that need to be addressed:

• How to decentralize identiﬁcation for entities that use the credential through-

out the VC lifecycle?

• How to build a bridge between an academic institution and a student to earn

a graduation credential and use it?

12 Chapter 1. Introduction

• How to present academic credentials?

1.10 Delimitation

Beyond the scope of the SSI

Throughout this study, the broad phrase "SSI-based approaches" will be used

to refer to critical SSI vocabulary and concepts. This is because, as mentioned

in the State of the Art Chapter’s "Short Introduction to SSI," the term "SSI" may

refer to a collection of technologies and principles that are neither fully developed

nor in use. This means that the term "SSI" should not be interpreted literally.

Terminology is a problem since the breadth of SSI-based procedures is so broad

that they do not provide full answers to a large number of queries. This study

highlights the legislation that governs student privacy and access rights, as well as

access to student academic records, by focusing on real-world implementations of

student academic records. Other technology parties can help pilot project partners

and implementers collect and disseminate this information in this area. These

parties are detailed in the report, including a brief explanation of themselves and

comparisons to other similar parties, in order to provide a full picture, and several

of them are also used as bridges to accomplish the object goals speciﬁed in the

problem statements.

1.11 Methodology

Section 1.1’s stated objectives necessitate four steps: gathering theoretical back-

ground, devising solutions, building a conceptual layer and setting up an evalua-

tion scenario (see Figure 1.2). According to Mark’s study [10], a range of business

and information systems engineering approaches were used to achieve this. As

a result of reading published articles and books, a theoretical framework is devel-

oped as well as a foundation that may be used in all subsequent phases of research.

Research on the topic of self-sovereign identity, decentralization of identity,

and veriﬁable credentials was conducted using Google Scholar and the Aalborg

University Library Catalogue, as well as Van’s [61] complex query "SSI-academic-

student-degree-diploma-employment." and following subsequent queries:

("Self-sovereign identity" OR "SSI ").

OR (

("Decentralize" OR "ledger")

AND ("identity management system" OR “idm”)

1.11. Methodology 13

Figure 1.2: Method of investigation

AND ("solution" OR "design" OR "literature review" OR "poll" OR “question-

naire”)

AND ("veriﬁable credentials" OR "did" OR “dvdr” OR “data registry”)

)

In addition, data is gathered through cross-sectional research, typically in the

form of expert surveys. Questions are used to evaluate not only the solution

overview but also to establish what is needed to meet a student’s speciﬁc needs.

Learn more about the expert selection process and questions in Chapter 4. The

structural design is created using a combination of reference modeling and proto-

types. Both allow for the production of a design prototype that accurately depicts

a speciﬁc problem and can be used in conjunction to ﬁnd new knowledge. This

is a fascinating thought to ponder when it comes to designing the evaluation sce-

nario. The [14] has deﬁned the term "real-world artifact" as a component of design

science, and this thesis falls under that deﬁnition.

To summarize, the subsequent research topics represent a synthesis of the pre-

viously disclosed studies and methodologies that have been utilized. Listed in the

form of separated sub-questions, they follow the problem formulation.

1.11.1 Research Developments: Requirement Speciﬁcation

Initial project milestones include a "Technical Requirement Speciﬁcation" and "Eval-

uation of the Existing Situation." For this, one needs ﬁrst obtain high-level "Analyt-

ical" - domain knowledge - understanding and comprehension before evaluating

14 Chapter 1. Introduction

the current state of the art. A thorough examination of the ﬁctitious system’s fun-

damental capacities is required here, in particular one will be able to evaluate the

current state of the art in the ﬁeld by examining each of the study questions pro-

vided in Section 1.9. This work is all about gathering and assessing important

information that can help solve research problems.

The ’Collecting requirements for participating entities’ phase can be started af-

ter what is practicable is determined, and this should lead to the construction of an

initial deﬁnition of the participating entities’ entity requirement. The development

approach will be guided by user scenarios and past study on how the projected

system will be utilized. Potential students are prohibited from participating since

the advantages are so minor. Based on these circumstances, the system’s usefulness

could also be limited.

Chapter 2

Evolution of Identity Management

in the Digital Age

The identity of a person, whether digital or analog, is composed of a sequence of

individual identities. If a user requires Internet access, he or she may do it through

the use of one or more partial identities. There is a possibility that some of the in-

formation contained in each partial identity overlaps with that contained in other

partial identities [see ﬁgure 2.1]. These partial identities are frequently employed

in daily life, necessitating the usage of a mobile digital identity, compatibility with

several systems, and user maintenance of the partial identities. The name, home

address, and academic credentials of an individual all contribute to their job iden-

tity. It is conceivable to own multiple distinct partial identities. A person may

assume a variety of distinct partial identities depending on the circumstances [6].

2.1 Identity management issues in the digital age

Due to the exponential growth of digital interactions in the digital age, identity

management is critical. Physical systems are only partially or completely digital. It

is critical to adapt physical identity management systems’ advantages to their dig-

ital counterparts. Through digital identity management solutions, users can share

their identities with third parties (DIMS) [6]. In the analog world, identity is rou-

tinely veriﬁed via an ID card, passport, or driver’s license. In today’s digital age,

this is impossible [67]. Historically, physical identiﬁcation certiﬁcates were pro-

tected by difﬁcult-to-forge qualities and photographs. Traditionally, users’ online

identities were managed through the creation of domain-speciﬁc user accounts that

were accessible via username and password. This is not always true. Each user

account requires its own unique username and password. Due to the ease with

which password management may be accomplished, it is fundamentally unsafe.

For instance, each of the twenty accounts [67] uses six or seven different passwords.

16 Chapter 2. Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age

Often, a single password can be used to access many services. As a result of the

identiﬁcation, third parties are more likely to proﬁt from it. Password organizers

and notes can assist you in keeping track of several passwords. Using numerous

passwords makes access control more difﬁcult. In either instance, the user must

spend considerable effort or be very aware of the security concerns associated with

the assaults. Internet-based identity-related data cannot be used across domains.

Registration with multiple service providers is time consuming and costly. As a

result, users’ identities are limited to the context of the program they are currently

using. Frequently, the data and information obtained are irrelevant or useless [29]

outside of the context in which they were collected and thus cannot be used.

Access to basic essentials such as health care, social security, education, and

ﬁnancial services is taken for granted in the Western world. Despite this, over 1.1

billion individuals worldwide lack identiﬁcation and are unable to access essential

services. Individuals can participate in society on a more equal basis using digital

IDs, which could help remedy this problem [46]. Today’s international students

require more than the current generation of digital IDs [89]. These issues were

classiﬁed into four categories:

• 1.Ownership and Governance of Academic Credentials

• 2.Authentication with a password

• 3.Identity Data in Selective Form

• 4.Forgery of Credentials and Identity Fraud

Students lack control over their academic credentials as a result of not possess-

ing them. Recruitment agencies and consulting organizations beneﬁt from this by

amassing data on students in order to customise advertising space on connected

markets. Additionally, a lack of control implies that agencies, corporations, and

local institutions have the ability to refuse students access to their credentials at

their discretion. Password-based authentication presents a security risk as well,

owing to the widespread usage of weak passwords, which might result in identity

theft. To avoid academic records being misused, students must create unique and

complicated passwords for each of their credentials, which is difﬁcult without the

use of a password manager. Dashlane study indicates that the typical client man-

ages 147 passwords [34]. While such tools simplify password management, they

may fall short of adequately protecting users against security concerns[evaluation,

adapt, defenses]. One-time passwords, which enable users to sign in to many ser-

vices using their Google account, can help alleviate this issue, but they also create

dependency and centralization. Third, identifying data is dispersed across multiple

agencies and identity suppliers, complicating maintenance. Duplication, mistakes,

and out-of-date data sets are widespread as a result. Additionally, the absence of

2.2. Identities 17

open standards impedes interoperability between providers, which might be used

to retrieve, relocate, or delete sensitive data. These programs, which have been on-

going for more than four years [22], [25], [81], are being accused for further lagging

small competitors [48], [89].

2.2 Identities

What is a human’s essence? That person’s name, gender, home town and occupa-

tion are likely to be mentioned, as well as philanthropic and political afﬁliations.

In his work Identity management and its support for multilateral security, Sebes-

tian [6] explains that a person’s identity is made up of many partial identities.

So, depending on the situation, it takes one of its many partial identities, each of

which symbolizes the individual as a human being. For example, a partial identity

for health care includes medical history, but a partial identity for work includes

certiﬁcates. Some information may overlap, therefore these distinct components

of identity are not usually addressed individually. Notably, an individual choose

whatever information to share with which party and when. Figure 2.1 depicts a

person named Alice as an example of partial identity.

Figure 2.1: Partial Identities (Source: [6])

It is critical to strike a careful balance between maintaining conﬁdentiality and

delivering necessary information to the other side. While kiosk merchants should

not request personal information for water purchases, age veriﬁcation is a valid

justiﬁcation for giving personal information for liquor transactions. While ofﬁcial

18 Chapter 2. Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age

evidence, such as a state identiﬁcation card, is usually used to verify an individ-

ual’s identity, non-ofﬁcial documentation, such as a customer card, may also be

used. Due to the fact that the documents are in the user’s possession, they can

be shown only to the individuals they choose, at their discretion. Additionally, of-

ﬁcial identiﬁcation documents are developed and standardized to assure the best

possible level of security and interoperability. Other countries can authenticate

the authenticity of these documents simply by inspecting them, without contact-

ing any authorities directly. The verifying party’s belief in the issuing authority is

what provides them with conﬁdence in the data’s legitimacy [90].

Numerous procedures have been migrated to the digital sphere as a result of

the rising digitization of many parts of our life. Digital services are increasingly re-

lying on digital identities, which are theoretically identical to physical ones. They

enable entities, like as persons or things, to verify their identity online through the

use of unique characteristics [19], [23]. Kim [11] deﬁnes digital identity in greater

depth as "a collection of statements made by a digital subject about itself or an-

other digital subject." Claims, which are deﬁned in this context as "An assertion

of something’s truth, typically one that is contested or contested," can be used to

express the aforementioned characteristics of a digital subject, which is deﬁned as

"A person or thing represented or existing in the digital realm that is described or

dealt with." The issue is that analogue identities and their associated documenta-

tion frequently lack or lack widely accepted digital representations suitable for use

as digital identities [8], [33]. As a result, the patchwork of unique identities dis-

cussed in this chapter is distinct from digital identities based on the originals. For

the convenience of the reader, the study detailed the various stages of developing

a digital identity below [24], [90].

2.3 Digital identity management development phases

In today’s digital world, there are numerous methods for managing one’s iden-

tity. Allen’s work has been cited in over 200 titles [24], according to a Google

Scholar user query based on his work [24]. Allen believes that since the inception

of the Internet, the evolution of online identities, or digital identities, has been a

four-stage process. Self-sovereign identities evolved as a result of the following

developments: centralized identities, user-oriented identities, federated identities,

and self-sovereign identities [24], as depicted in the Figure: 2.2

2.3.1 Centralized identity

Administrators, for example, are responsible for uniﬁed identities that span the

entire system. Their true identities are inextricably linked to that of the user. Only

the appropriate entity has the ability to delete an identiﬁer, which complicates user

2.3. Digital identity management development phases 19

Figure 2.2: Development phases of digital identities

monitoring and increases the risk of misuse. Interoperability is often threatened

when relying on a single institution. Due to the impossibility of sending the user’s

identity, another service must generate it. Additionally, the central organization

can track users’ interactions with the system. Data storage is redundant since it is

not synchronized and hence may become out of date fast.

A centralized identity is one that is produced and maintained by a single or-

ganization or institution (see ﬁgure 2.3). In 1988, the Internet Assigned Number

Figure 2.3: Identity in a centralised context (Source: [86])

Authority was established; in 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names

and Numbers was formed; and in 2000, the Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) was formed

to monitor SSL certiﬁcates. The hierarchical structure of an SSL certiﬁcate is readily

seen in a browser, particularly the latter. To illustrate, the root authority enables

another organization to govern its structure while yet exercising complete com-

mand and control. This is critical for a multitude of reasons. The identity of a

person can be entirely controlled, with the power to delete or create a false one at

anytime. As a result, either intentionally or inadvertently, a hack may result in the

latter. Recent incidents [18] have demonstrated the vulnerability of central author-

ity and, by implication, the entire hierarchy (chain of trust). Due to the absence

of an identity layer, all internet-based services have centralized their operations. A

fantastic illustration of this is the amount of accounts necessary to access various

20 Chapter 2. Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age

services by a typical internet user. Personal information is once again out of the

public’s reach [24].

It’s not just passwords that the user has to remember. Although this is a prob-

lem for the services, they are required by law to safeguard a vast amount of per-

sonal information. However, this has advantages in that the services can operate

more autonomously and without third parties while maintaining complete control

over their data [90].

2.3.2 User-oriented identity

The term "user-oriented identity management" was coined to address the short-

comings of traditional, centrally administered identity systems. Users have com-

plete control over their access to a range of services (and thus their partial iden-

tities). However, passwords can be used for a variety of purposes, and account

information may be difﬁcult to transfer to other websites, posing security and us-

ability concerns. Individual identifying characteristics (such as a legitimate job or

driver’s license) must be established on a regular basis for each service. Due to

a local application that collects and manages access data for many services, users

can use a single password to access several services (or authentication step). On

the other hand, the supplier maintains a record of the attributes of their ﬁctitious

identities. They can also be used in other online services due to their shared nature

[24], [29].

As a part of user-centric identiﬁcation, the goal is to eliminate the need for fed-

erations and give users the ability to take control of their identities across a wide

variety of organizations [24]. This is made possible by eliminating the need for fed-

erations and integrating an online identity directly into the design of the Internet,

as Allen [7], [24] points out. People’s digital identities were at the heart of their

mission. As part of their digital identity, people have the power to choose what

data is collected and who gets access to it. Microsoft Passport and Liberty Alliance

Project were too business-oriented and focused on information privatization for

Jordan’s preference in 2003, he said [7]. They feel their digital identities should

be a public good rather than a private beneﬁt since private corporations’ ﬁnancial

aims may be different from those of society.

Many new organizations and activities have been born out of these ideals.

The Internet Identity Workshop (IIW), a major player in this ﬁeld, was founded

in part because to the efforts of the Identity Commons and the Identity Gang.

User-centric identiﬁcation is deﬁned by the IIW community, which is represented

by open standards such as OAuth (2010), OpenID Connect (OIDC) (2014), and

OpenID 2.0 (2006). User permission and interoperability, ideas that were either

absent or impossible to achieve in earlier models, are summarized by Allen [24].

As a result of the rise of social logins from ﬁrms like Facebook and Google, these

2.3. Digital identity management development phases 21

approaches have also proved successful [86]. The basic concept of user-centric

identities couldn’t be expanded upon. They have complete and entire control over

the system because the SSO providers who register them have the identiﬁcation

data. Here’s an example of how an IDP user operates as a go-between for other

companies and the IDPs they’re trying to access(see Figure 2.4 ). An example of a

Figure 2.4: Identities centered on users and their relationships (Source: [86])

system that allows users to set up their own OpenID provider is OpenID, which

Allen [24] points to as an example. However, this strategy is rarely used in practice

due to its complexity. It is because of these issues that user-centric identities are

unable to address the basic concerns for which they were designed. Despite the

fact that user-centric identities are now merely interoperable, some literature fails

to make the distinction between federated and user-centric identities [24], [86].

2.3.3 Federated identity

When it comes to digital identity, federated identity management is the next log-

ical step in the process. Users can share their partial identities with other service

providers by logging into a centralized log-in point. Single sign-on (SSO) is the

corporate term for this notion, which is widely provided by companies and so-

cial networks like Facebook and Google. By using single sign-on (SSO), users can

quickly and simply change their identities across several services. Data transfer is

required to maintain a connection to the central log-in service. The disadvantage

for the user is the reliance on the log-in service as the source of identity. Additional

to this, the central log-in server is responsible for all partial identities and is always

22 Chapter 2. Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age

able to track which services are visited by users logged in via partial identities. The

risk of identity theft increases signiﬁcantly if unauthorized individuals obtain ac-

cess to the central login service’s access data. Access to all linked partial identities

may be granted as a result of the service’s existence. A lack of interoperability and

reliance on third-party vendors have resulted in the present systems for managing

digital IDs. Today’s identity management systems and user needs have not yet

been addressed by a widely adopted solution.

As part of the second phase of growth, federated identities were developed

to eliminate power structures built around a single authority. Multiple business

groups came up with this approach for dispersing control among federated au-

thorities. It was Microsoft’s Passport project, which debuted in 1999 and offered

a federated identity that could be used across several sites, that paved the way in

this area. Even so, Microsoft’s control over the federation was compromised in

order to achieve this uniformity. Liberty Alliance Project, which was launched in

2001, aimed to build a genuine Federation of many companies that shared control.

As a result of this totalitarian system, users lost all control over their data. In the

end, the sites’ authority was preserved [24]. Using digital identiﬁcation eliminates

Figure 2.5: Identity in a federated management context (Source: [86])

the need for users to manage several identities and accounts for various services,

while also reducing the administrative costs for businesses. Logging onto another

federation service requires users to ﬁrst get in touch with their data’s issuer and

owner, an identity provider (such as Microsoft). As a result, the user has no control

over their data and is completely reliant on the identity provider’s continuous exis-

tence(see Figure 2.5). IDPs collect data from numerous sources to develop proﬁles

of its users, which can cause a slew of issues [75].

2.3.4 Self-Sovereign Identity: a new way to manage identity.

SSI has evolved in recent years to address the issues outlined in the preceding

chapters and others. SSI has been dubbed the "next generation of digital identities"

2.3. Digital identity management development phases 23

due to its ability to address the shortcomings and limitations of existing digital

identity management systems. Despite this, many individuals, particularly in the

current period, continue to be perplexed by the phrase and its implications [41].

Tobin and Reed (2017) [29] deﬁne the SSI stage as the ﬁnal stage in the develop-

ment of a digital identity. Digital identity management is a critical component

of this initiative, which also encompasses security and mobility. Prior identities,

according to Allen(2016) [24], are a component of a user’s core identity, and vice

versa. As a result, consumers’ independence and control over their identities must

be maintained across a broad range of services. To be useful, an SSI must be both

replaceable and transportable. Before user assertions about their identify may be

accepted, they must be validated by a third party. Third parties must be able

to verify someone’s identity in order for it to be validated. Comparing SSI with

other identity management systems to illustrate the basic notion.(See Figure 2.6)

According to Allen [24], self-sovereign identity (SSI) is the next and most advanced

Figure 2.6: Comparative analysis of several identity management systems (Idea: [24], [29], [86])

level of digital identities available today. When users participate in identity-related

operations, they should have total control and management over their personal in-

formation. Alex and Reed(2021) [86] deﬁne this as a "[...] transfer of power from

the network’s core [...] to its periphery [...]" in which all users communicate di-

rectly as peers in a self-sovereign manner. Figure 2.7 illustrates this mechanism

in motion. One can ﬁnd the new element register, which acts as a decentralized

public key infrastructure [86], here. Chapter 3 goes into greater information about

this. As detailed in Allen’s ten principles [24], the system is based on Kim’s [11]

research into the "Laws of Identity," which distinguishes SSI from other identity

management systems.

24 Chapter 2. Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age

Figure 2.7: Control shifting in favor of SSI

Allen’s [24] ten principles of SSI

• 1. Existence - Users must be self-sufﬁcient. In the end, self-sovereign identity

is predicated on the ineffable "I." There will never be a fully digital world.

This must be the core of one’s self-sufﬁciency. Having a self-sovereign iden-

tity merely makes some limited components of the "I" visible.

• 2. Control - Users must retain control over their data. Users have the ﬁnal

say on their own identiﬁcation, as long as they follow established protocols

that verify their claims are genuine. As a result, they should always be able

to update or delete information. Users may make statements about another

user, but these should not be considered part of that person’s identity.

• 3. Access - Data privacy is a fundamental right. A user’s identiﬁcation must

be easily available at all times. Gatekeepers and obfuscated information must

be abolished. However, users should be aware that they cannot go back and

amend all of their identity claims. No one else’s data is in the same place

because users only have access to their own.

• 4. Transparency - Transparency of systems and algorithms is vital. A net-

work’s governance and management systems must be accessible to anyone.

The method’s operation should be obvious to all users because it is open-

source, well-known, and unrestricted by architecture.

• 5. Persistence - Identity requires longevity to build and maintain. Ideally,

users should be able to retain their identities indeﬁnitely. Privacy and data

integrity are not compromised. We should try to maintain our identities as

2.3. Digital identity management development phases 25

long as possible until new identiﬁcation systems emerge. Users’ "right to be

forgotten" cannot be violated; users should be able to delete their identities

if they so desire, and claims should be updated or removed as needed. This

needs a clear distinction between identity and the assertions made in support

of it.

• 6. Portability - Identity data and services must be transferable. The identity

should not be kept by a single third-party entity, even if it is trusted and con-

sidered to act in the user’s best interest. The issue is that things can vanish,

and this is true of most things on the internet. Consumers may relocate if

their existing regime is abolished. The user retains control of their identity

regardless of the circumstances.

• 7. Interoperability - Identiﬁers should be used as widely as possible. An

identity is worthless if it only serves a small group. A 21st-century digi-

tal identiﬁcation system’s purpose is to make identity information publicly

available globally without compromising individual autonomy. Due to per-

sistence and autonomy, these publicly available identities can last indeﬁnitely.

• 8. Consent - For this to happen, the user must provide authorization. An

interoperable system makes it easy to share identities and claims. Before

sharing any data, users must give consent. An employer, credit reporting

agency, or close friend can make claims on behalf of a user, but the user must

still approve the claim before it is valid. Not all consent is mutual, but it must

be fully informed and understood.

• 9. Minimalization - Claims disclosure should be kept to a minimal. Only

essential information should be supplied to complete the task at hand. Keep

in mind that if a speciﬁc age is required, the exact age should not be revealed.

Selective disclosure, range proofs, and other zero-knowledge techniques may

support this hypothesis, although non-correlation is difﬁcult (if not impossi-

ble) to achieve.

• 10. Protection - Users’ rights must be safeguarded. When individual liber-

ties and rights collide with the network’s interests, identity networks must

prioritize individual liberties and rights. Identity veriﬁcation must be decen-

tralized, censorship-resistant, and force-resistant.

This abbreviation stands for "Self-Sovereign Identity," which is derived in 2012

from [60] as "Sovereign Source Authority," according to Allen [24]. Marlinspike

makes the point throughout this book that severe political systems violate the hu-

man right to self-determination. He desired for people to have greater control over

their digital identities via Patric Deegan’s Open Mustard Seed. He embarked on

the endeavor in 2013 with a speciﬁc objective in mind. This approach resulted in

26 Chapter 2. Evolution of Identity Management in the Digital Age

the Windhover Principles (2014) and the concept of Self-sovereign Identity, both of

which have since been reﬁned [30], [35]. Since then, SSI and blockchain technology

have been at the forefront of much discussion within the IIW community. Since

then, various government bodies have attempted to conduct additional research on

the subject. The IIW’s scientiﬁc and technology concerns were addressed in a 2015

document produced by the Homeland Security Department’s division of science

and technology. Countries such as China and South Korea, for example, have taken

advantage of the chance. Standards authorized by the World Wide Web Consor-

tium (W3C) have been created to make Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) a reality. They

will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter [86].

Chapter 3

State of Art: Recent Developments

In order to apply SSI, it is necessary to adhere to the ten principles. Because of

this, it is essential to know how to implement an SSI solution on a technical level

in addition to the ten SSI principles. An understanding of which SSI’s core com-

ponents may be implemented utilizing already accessible technologies and, when

integrated, constitute an SSI solution can be gained from this research. Because

of this, this chapter demonstrates the various core components and underlying

technologies.

SSI along with many other standards rely on Decentralized Identiﬁer and Ver-

iﬁable Credentials, thus this section goes into deeper detail about those two foun-

dational standards.

3.1 Standardization of technology and establishment of tech-

nical foundations

An explanation of the standards and technologies used by SSI is provided in this

section in order to help implementers and stakeholders (such as universities, ed-

ucational institutions, and organizations for recruiting) get started with the im-

plementation of the solutions described here. Other topics covered here include

potential research and development projects that could help create cutting-edge

tools to protect students’ personal data and give them greater access to it.

3.1.1 Veriﬁable Credentials

Its standard, lightweight data model for presenting statements of veriﬁable authen-

ticity, is a critical enabler of interoperability. This tool can represent a wide range

of data standards.

W3C Veriﬁable Credentials Data Model [49] deﬁnes a veriﬁable credential (VC)

as one that can be conﬁrmed and is not tampered with. Veriﬁable credentials (VCs)

28 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

are used to store and deliver an issuer’s content. A VC can also be used to con-

vey a driver’s license, a degree, a certiﬁcate of completion of an online course,

job records, and other information. They can be linked to competency deﬁni-

tions and additional credential information, allowing for digital and semantic in-

terchange. These capabilities enable student-focused solutions like the students’

personal vault to safely store credentials for international students (such as pass-

words).

Consider the VC as a container that can serve multiple functions. It facilitates

the packaging and evaluation of content information by providing an interoperable

framework. These tools and services ensure that data is managed in a consistent

manner. Example: A user’s wallet may save and show record type metadata for

the purpose of categorizing and searching records [49], [50].

Veriﬁable credentials can be used in favor of physical certiﬁcates that contain

the same information. Digital signatures and other tamper-evident technology can

be used to get more dependable veriﬁed credentials.

They may build presentations and distribute them to veriﬁers to demonstrate

their conﬁrmed credentials.

According to studies [49], [78], veriﬁable credentials and validated presenta-

tions are more important than their physical counterparts when it comes to gener-

ating trust online.

VC’s Terminology Overview

This section demonstrates how the critical actors in a paradigm where credential

veriﬁcation may be beneﬁcial interact and perform their assigned duties (Figure:

3.1). A role abstraction can be constructed in a variety of ways. The assignment of

responsibilities identiﬁes future standardized interfaces and protocols. The follow-

ing jobs will be introduced as a result of this standard:

• Holder When an entity possesses one or more veriﬁable credentials and pro-

duces veriﬁable presentations based on those credentials, it is said to be ful-

ﬁlling a job function. Holders include students, employees, candidates, and

customers, to name a few examples [49], (See Figure: 3.1)

• Issuer Credentialing entails making assertions about a subject or subjects,

developing a veriﬁable credential from those assertions, and distributing the

veriﬁed credential to the proper recipient. Businesses, universities, trade as-

sociations, governments, and individuals are all issuers [49], (See Figure: 3.1)

• Subject A claimant is a person who is the subject of a claim. Humans, an-

imals, and objects are all examples of subjects that can be written about.

Occasionally, the individual possesses a credential that is easily veriﬁable,

but this is not always the case. Consider the following scenarios: a parent

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 29

(the holder) may possess veriﬁable credentials on behalf of his or her child

(the subject) [49], (See Figure: 3.1)

• Veriﬁer An organization’s function in accepting and processing veriﬁed cre-

dentials, which may or may not be presented in a veriﬁable manner. Veriﬁers

include employers, security people, international organizations, and websites

[49], (See Figure: 3.1)

• Veriﬁable Data Registry These are just a few examples of data needed to

implement veriﬁable credential schemes. A system can help generate and

verify data by acting as a middleman. Relative IDs are sometimes required.

The term "veriﬁed data registry" describes trusted, decentralized, and dis-

tributed data registries. Many systems store data in multiple reputable data

repositories [49], [78].

Figure 3.1: The roles and data ﬂows that underpin this speciﬁcation [49]

3.1.2 Veriﬁable Credential Data Model

A veriﬁable credential can be used to illustrate the following:

• A standardized collection of credential-related metadata

• A container for the credential’s content

• Flexibility in terms of format/encoding

30 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

Figure 3.2: Veriﬁable Credential Data Model.(Source: [51])

Claims

Claims are statements made on a speciﬁc subject. Something can be considered

a subject when one can make claims about it. Claims are expressed through the

usage of subject-property-value relationships [49], [50], [78].

Credentials

When an individual makes one or more claims, the term "credentials" is used.

Additional metadata may exist to describe the credential’s characteristics, such as

the holder’s name, the credential’s expiration date/time (and possibly the method

of revocation), and an identiﬁer, such as an alphanumeric code or an alphanumeric

string. The issuer may sign the metadata. A veriﬁed credential includes tamper-

evident assertions and metadata that demonstrate who issued it [49].

Presentations

One or more veriﬁable credentials are used to obtain data that is presented in a

manner that allows the data’s authorship to be established. When credentials are

directly presented, they become veriﬁable presentations [68]. It is also possible

to have veriﬁable presentations that are cryptographically veriﬁable but do not

contain veriﬁable credentials [49].

Most presentations have a lot of data about the same topic, but from a variety

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 31

of sources. A person, organization, or entity’s attributes are typically reﬂected in

this data aggregate.

3.1.3 Veriﬁable Credential Proof Mechanisms

The Veriﬁable Credentials Data Model is extensible in order to support a diverse ar-

ray of established and emerging proof systems. The "Veriﬁable Credentials Imple-

mentation Guidelines" [49] are an excellent resource for those interested in learning

more about these procedures (Guidelines). Rather than substituting for the Guide-

lines, this section will provide additional discussion and recommendations about

the current state of these techniques.

There must be at least one proof mechanism and the details necessary to eval-

uate that evidence in order for a certiﬁcation or presentation to be veriﬁable.

External proofs and embedded proofs are the two types of proof techniques

mentioned in W3C speciﬁcation [49]. For instance, a JSON Web Token can be

considered an external proof because it comprises a self-contained description of

the data model. An embedded proof, in the context of data security, is a system

that embeds the evidence inside the data, such as a Linked Data Signature.

JSON Web Token

JSON Web Tokens (JWT) continue to be a popular way for two parties to convey

claims. Existing systems and libraries can participate in the system described in

Section 3.1.1 Terminology Overview by implementing a Veriﬁable Credentials Data

Model for JWT. A JWT is a set of claims included in a JSON object [57]. It is

contained in a JSON Web Signature (JWS) or a JSON Web Encryption (JWE). This

speciﬁcation does not cover the use of JWE.

Linked Data Proofs

Through Linked Data, URLs, JSON-LD, and other Web standards are used to pub-

lish information on the Internet. This presentation format simpliﬁes the process of

discovering new data and expanding the existing graph of knowledge [49], [70].

The decentralized structure of Linked Data eliminates impediments to large-scale

integration. To ensure the security of this standard, Linked Data Proofs and Linked

Data Cryptographic Suites must be used.

Veriﬁed credentials and presentations can be stored using the Linked Data

Proofs format because no additional processing is required in comparison to JSON

Web Tokens. Veriﬁed examples from this standard can be used to protect a veriﬁ-

able credential or presentation using Linked Data Signatures.

32 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

3.1.4 Comparison between Linked data proofs and JSON Web Tokens

The most frequently used proof types in current veriﬁable credential deployments

are Linked Data Proofs and JSON Web Tokens. Implementers may struggle to com-

prehend the relative merits of each. Thus, in order to summarize the Guidelines’

tables, the following table summarizes the advantages of using both methods of

proof.

Features that promotes JWTs

• Mature library in multiple languages

• Native platform toolchain (no extra libraries)

Features that promotes Linked Data Proofs

• Open Data Modeling

• JSON-based ﬁle sharing

Mature library in multiple languages

JWTs have robust libraries for a range of computer languages. Linked Data Proofs,

on the other hand, are a more newer standard with less library support at the

moment [49], [57].

Native platform toolchain

To contrast with JWTs, JSON-LD libraries are still in their infancy and are not

usually included in the native platform toolchains for which they were designed

[49], [57].

Open Data Modeling

JSON-LD By providing a "context" in which statements can be made, proofs en-

hance the open-world approach of linked data. Unambiguous claims can be made

because of this [70]. For diploma records to be portable and interoperable, linked

data approaches are needed since they allow academic qualiﬁcations to be mapped

to competency framework, taxonomies, and ontologies.

JSON-based ﬁle sharing

Due to the normalization step that occurs before to signing and verifying the cre-

dential, it is feasible to save the signed credential as a JSON-native document.

Historically, the capability of educational records with veriﬁable credentials to uti-

lize common JSON tools following their issue has been considered as a positive

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 33

feature. This, however, may alter as the number of valid credential tool sets grows.

Surprisingly, proponents of JWT claim that this level of growing phenomenon is

bad because it lengthens and complicates the processing process [49], [70].

3.1.5 Advanced proof mechanisms

The above-mentioned proof formats are compatible with more advanced (and ever-

evolving) proof procedures. Pilots that concentrate primarily on usage situations

and ﬁtness are needed to study the potential for enhanced privacy provided by

these technologies in greater depth. With zero-knowledge proofs, a statement can

be established without the need to provide additional details. Despite the fact

that this method isn’t widely used currently, interest in it is growing due to the

enhanced anonymity it provides. There has been considerable interest in the BBS+

Signatures 2020 Draft Speciﬁcation, which has been offered as a straightforward

implementation method to zero-knowledge proofs.

3.1.6 Zero Knowledge Proof and BBS+ Signatures 2020 Draft Speciﬁca-

tion

BBS+

As described in the study, data reduction is essential for stakeholder implemen-

tation to be successful. Some of the anticipated dangers described in the analysis

chapter can be addressed through the use of data reduction techniques. Allen’s ten

principles for SSI include the concept of "minimization," which says that the num-

ber of released claims should be maintained to a bare minimum in subsection 2.3.4

of the identity management development phases in chapter 2. Known as selective

disclosures, this technique allows a user to conceal some attributes of a credential,

similar to the blackening of paper in the analog world, while maintaining the rest

of the credential’s functionality. What is known as ZKP is the following step in

this process; it is during this phase that the actual attribute isn’t sent, but rather

an assertion of a value that conﬁrms what the veriﬁer is looking for. For example,

an age check does not require the veriﬁer to know the subject’s precise age, only

that he or she is older than the age of majority in the country. Two of the most

regularly used methods in the community are the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL)

signature and the BBS+ signature, which are both based on the BBS+ algorithm.

Furthermore, the keys and credentials that came with them were quite large, which

made them prohibitively expensive to generate [76], [77], [82]. Instead of a single

signature for a single message, this signature is comprised of a collection of sig-

natures for a variety of messages. The holder is then able to extract the signature,

which can only represent a subset of the document’s attributes because it is a sub-

set of the signature. In contrast to Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures, the current

34 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

BBS+ implementations do not accept the usage of predicates for the purpose of

implementing the ZKP in its entirety.

It is conceivable to receive such assistance, but it has not been the primary fo-

cus of research in cryptography up to this point. If the value of such predicates is

included directly in the VC as a separate property, the issuer can choose to reveal

it selectively or not at all, according on the circumstances. The W3C Credentials

Community Group is currently in charge of an unofﬁcial draft of the "BBS+ Sig-

natures 2020" speciﬁcation [77], which is currently being managed by the group

[76].

Zero Knowledge Proof

Cryptographic techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs are used to demonstrate

to other entities that they are aware of a given value, but without revealing the

value itself [4]. In this context, it’s used to denote that an object is aware of a speciﬁc

value. An established institution may award an honorary degree on an individual

without revealing the student’s identity or any other personal information that

may be contained on the degree itself. Zero-knowledge proof approaches allow a

holder to do the following tasks:

• Combine several veriﬁable credentials from multiple issuers into a single ver-

iﬁed presentation without disclosing the veriﬁer’s veriﬁable credential or the

IDs used to verify the credentials. " Due to this, it becomes more difﬁcult for

the veriﬁer to build an alliance with any of the credential issuers.

• A validator should be able to see just the claims in a veriﬁed credential with-

out needing to provide a huge number of veriﬁable credentials to do so.

Thus, the holder will be able to submit only the information requested by the

veriﬁer.

• As long as the veriﬁer’s data schema is followed, the issuer doesn’t need to be

contacted again to receive a derived credential that is prepared in accordance

with that template. As a result, holders of veriﬁed credentials can use them

in a variety of ways.

For the purpose of selectively disclosing private information, the W3C speciﬁcation

includes a data model that incorporates zero-knowledge proof procedures [52].

Holders of zero-knowledge veriﬁable presentations must ask an issuer to supply

a veriﬁable credential so that the holder can generate a proof from the initially

provided veriﬁable credential, allowing the holder to present information to a ver-

iﬁer while safeguarding the veriﬁer’s privacy. If the document has been signed by

the issuer, it is possible for the holder to verify the authenticity of that signature

without disclosing the values signed, or at least only a subset of the values signed.

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 35

Without divulging the presence of the signature, the standard approach is used to

verify this. (Figure: 3.3)

Figure 3.3: Zero-Knowledge protocol between parties [4]

There are two prerequisites for using veriﬁable credentials in zero-knowledge

proof systems [1].

• In order for the holder to generate a veriﬁable presentation that shows only

the information desired by him or her, the veriﬁable credential must include

a proof that makes use of this capability.

• If a credential deﬁnition is to be utilized by all parties to perform various

zero-knowledge cryptographic activities, it must be deﬁned in the credential

schema property.

3.1.7 Decentralized Identiﬁers

In veriﬁable credentials, URIs (Uniform Resource Identiﬁers) are used to identify

the issuer and the learner (students/holder) [5]. A URL to an issuer proﬁle is the

most prevalent URI for an issuer proﬁle in the current state of Open Badges v2

implementations (i.e. web addresses). One of the ways in which VCs can iden-

tify both the issuer and the student is by using this form of URI. Decentralized,

long-term, and veriﬁable digital identities can be created by using a decentralised

identiﬁer (DID). Initially, DIDs were used in conjunction with VCs in order to gain

control of a unique identity through the use of authentication procedures, signing

36 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

Figure 3.4: Decentralized identiﬁer [74], [86]

keys and other secure methods of communicating with the individual. DIDs have

the potential to dramatically increase the overall durability of public key infras-

tructure (PKI) management in theory by allowing for planned key rotation and

recovery in the event of device loss or other catastrophic failures. Additional ef-

fort, both technically and, more importantly, usability-wise, will be required to

realize these potential gains, which will require additional resources. According to

the ﬁndings [36], [39], [44], studies of student-focused applications have demon-

strated that we are only at the beginning of our understanding of how a student

might effectively connect with this environment. Numerous DID implementations

make use of blockchain technology. While this technology improves longevity and

control, it also creates new technological dependencies. Numerous articles and

research studies have argued in favor of more research and development in these

potentially lucrative ﬁelds.

Interoperability "bridges" between digital identiﬁcation systems that are cen-

tralized, federated, or distributed can beneﬁt from the usage of DIDs. As an exam-

ple, the did:web strategy advises that web-based DIDs be used to "bootstrap trust

by leveraging the existing reputation of a web domain" in order to increase the use

of DIDs on the internet [31], [71]. Blockchain-based DIDs have the advantages of

this system without the uncertainty that comes with it. For example, when used

to connect to contemporary authentication systems such as OpenId Connect, these

DIDs can give the student with greater control and utility.

3.1.8 Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)

To ensure that students’ personal information is protected, one of our primary

goals is to make as little personal information about them as possible available to

the broader public. These two concerns emerge as a result of the application of this

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 37

rule: To begin, data must be made available to the general public in some instances.

For example, include the issuing university’s public identity and accompanying

service endpoint in the DID document is quite fair. Second, not all credentials are

valid for an unlimited period of time. As a result, credentials and the attributes

linked with them must be revoked by the institution that issued the credentials and

attributes. This is referred to as revocation in this context. Students who cheat on a

test, for example, should be subject to having their degree certiﬁcation taken away

from them. In a legal sense, the student cannot be compelled to remove his or her

VC. Therefore, the veriﬁcation institutions must be able to track and monitor the

development of the VC. According to theory, a verifying institution might contact

the VC’s giving university immediately and request that the VC’s certiﬁcate be

revoked. Making a service endpoint speciﬁcally for this purpose could be one

approach to achieving this goal, for example. It is necessary to standardize data

formats and protocols in order to deal with this situation effectively. This strategy,

on the other hand, would compromise SSI’s efforts to keep direct institutional

interaction from occurring. Because of the uniformity and fail-safety that platforms

provide, they may be a viable choice for some applications. These systems must

include the following functionalities as a bare minimum [53]:

• DIDs should be published to make the institution known to as many people

as possible, especially for institutional reasons.

• A revocation register is required in order to keep track of whether or not a

Veriﬁable credential is still in use.

• An open release of credential schema deﬁnitions and their related schemas is

necessary to facilitate semantic interoperability of veriﬁable credentials.

• Additionally, third-party authorization may be revoked as a result of the post-

ing of third-party authorization.

It is almost probable that using a centralized platform will result in dependency

on and lock-in to the platform in question. These challenges connected with a

central platform can be avoided by using DLTs, or decentralized, distributed sys-

tems, which are capable of overcoming them. Blockchains, which are a subset of

distributed ledger technology, are used in well-known SSI systems, such as Hy-

perledger Indy, to store and transfer information. Blockchains are distributed data

structures that allow for the transparent, chronological, and tamper-proof storing

of transactions grouped in blocks. Blockchains are used to store ﬁnancial transac-

tions [69]. When used in conjunction with an SSI architecture, distributed ledger

technologies (DLTs) and blockchains provide a number of beneﬁts, including:

• There are no single points of failure in the distributed ledger because of the

redundant, decentralized design.

38 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

• It is impossible to reverse a transaction or alter the data linked with it once it

has been recorded on a blockchain.

• All network participants have equal access to all transactions. It is possible

for all members of the network to see the most recent status change, such as

the assignment of a new identity.

• Every transaction has to be authorized and signed by the person who started

it. Thus, it is possible to track the origin of data in a transaction back to a

speciﬁc participant.

• A linked list of transactions is created as a result of the blockchain’s block

architecture, which cryptographically ties individual blocks together. Indi-

vidual transactions are automatically arranged in chronological order as a

result of this rule. For example, a revocation register’s content can be easily

checked for accuracy and timeliness thanks to this.

Although there are advantages to implementing a blockchain solution as part of an

SSI solution, there are also disadvantages to consider. For example, to prevent any

potential bottlenecks, it is recommended that as little data as possible be stored

on a distributed ledger system. Furthermore, no personal information should be

recorded in plain text on a (distributed) ledger of this nature. Even the secure stor-

ing of personal information on a distributed ledger is fraught with danger. Future

technological advancements (for example, quantum computing) may allow asym-

metric encryption to be broken, even if it is still regarded safe for the foreseeable

future [83]. Article 16 GDPR - Right to rectiﬁcation and deletion, 2018) also man-

dates that personal data be updated or erased if a person requests it. In light of

the intrinsic attribute of cryptographic tamper resistance that blockchains possess,

personal data should not be stored on the blockchain from a legal standpoint.

3.1.9 DIDComm

Asynchronous, secure, and asynchronous peer-to-peer communication protocol

based on the DID standard, DIDComm, also known as DID communication, is

used by agents to communicate with one another. It is the responsibility of the De-

centralized Identity Foundation’s DID-Comm Working Group to monitor the effort

[84][maomie], which is a direct product of the Hyperledger project’s operations

[55]. This means that any current protocol can be utilized because messages are

not dependent on the medium over which they are transmitted. When a standard

is centered on machine-readable communications, it opens the door to a greater

range of application scenarios in which anybody or any entity can send any type

of encrypted communication [86].

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 39

3.1.10 Decentralized Veriﬁable Data Registries

Decentralized veriﬁed data registries (DVDR) are used to maintain credential sta-

tus, such as whether a credential has been revoked, as well as identify management

for DID discovery and authentication [63]. Blockchains [42] are often used to do

this, although distributed ledgers such as the InterPlanetary File System(IPFS),

which is a distributed ledger system, can also be used to accomplish this [45]. By

using one of these methods, the issuer can keep the information required for cre-

dential veriﬁcation up to date without requiring veriﬁers to engage directly with

the issuer, resulting in time and money savings for both parties.

3.1.11 Comparative study of credential hosting services

Figure 3.5: ssi stack

40 Chapter 3. State of Art: Recent Developments

As illustrated in Figure 3.5, SSI’s technical stack is divided into ﬁve tiers and

three organizations. The W3C, DIF, and Hyperledger are just a few of the organi-

zations driving a deluge of open-source projects and standards. This comparison is

based on research conducted previously by organizations such as the Trust over IP

group and the Decentralized Identity Foundation (DIF) [53], [80], [92]. One of the

most noticeable changes in this situation is the separation of the communication

layer from the agent layer. Apart from the fact that it is utilized by agents, it is a

distinct collection of communication technologies that may be used to communi-

cate by any entity and is not a component of the agents themselves. The public

trust layer serves as the foundation for all following levels. This project’s objective

is to establish a public trust registry that contains DIDs and their associated DID

procedures and so functions as a public key infrastructure. In view of the above, a

blockchain or decentralized ﬁle system may be required in the future. In did:web,

one such centralized alternative, all method-speciﬁc activities including the DID

document are dependent on a centralized web server. The communication layer is

at the bottom of the stack, and it is responsible for controlling how data is sent be-

tween agents. This includes, but is not limited to, transit, envelope, and credential

exchange standards and protocols. At the fourth level, the credential layer contains

all of the standards and technologies utilized in the data model of credentials, such

as formats, proof types, disclosure, and revocation of credentials. The application

layer, as the highest level of abstraction, builds user applications based on the im-

plementation of speciﬁc use cases in the underlying layers. Along with the actual

data models for credentials, this contains the app’s business logic and technology

[53], [80], [86], [92]. Also with establishing the overall structure and elements of

the layers, these standards and community activities also create the technological

groundwork for the layers. This section detail the concrete activities taken by the

three largest organizations operating in this ﬁeld. To minimize confusion, keep

in mind that the material offered here is not exhaustive, but rather serves as an

illustration.

3.1.12 Privacy-preserving Credential Status

The Veriﬁable Credentials Data Model emphasizes that issuers must be able to

update the status of credentials, for example, by reporting that a credential has

been revoked, and that this should be done in a manner that promotes privacy as

a desired ecosystem quality. For example, no extra information about the student

should be revealed during revocation checks. Additionally, the Veriﬁable Creden-

tial Data Model advises against adding revocation status checks that alert the issuer

(or comparable parties) to the fact that a veriﬁcation check on a particular creden-

tial (or learner) was done.

This can be accomplished through a variety of means. Certain techniques make

3.1. Standardization of technology and establishment of technical foundations 41

available a list of revoked credentials’ hashes. Verifying a particular credential is

as simple as computing the (well-known) hash, retrieving the current list, and

checking to verify if the hash of the credential in question is included in the list, as

mentioned above. Along with the preceding recommendation, this list should be

decentralized.

3.1.13 Digital Wallet

The development of a personal wallet can begin with a common students degree

record wrapper data model, such as the one offered by VCs, but additional stan-

dards work is required to facilitate credential storage and exchange. Student-facing

tools must be intuitive to use and purpose-speciﬁc, as they present entirely new

methods of interacting with one’s data. Thus far, efforts to build student-centric

credential management solutions have encountered considerable criticism. For in-

stance, a Georgia Tech research on the usability of the Blockcerts program found

that students struggled with the application’s experience, method, and even con-

cepts. This raised concerns about the new method’s security and provenance. Ad-

ditionally, students expressed fear that the risk would be passed to them because,

under the existing system, they can seek assistance from the school rather than

being held accountable.

In addition to improving usability, additional work on standards is required.

For example, as the number of digital credentials issued to students continues to

grow, common access patterns, indexing, and encryption will become increasingly

important in the development of solutions to manage credentials. The World Wide

Web Consortium and the Decentralized Identity Foundation are now in the early

phases of developing these new standards and protocols, which are critical for

preventing lock-in and attaining interoperability.

Chapter 4

Questionnaires and Analysis

As an example, this chapter describes and evaluates an existing scenario by high-

lighting ﬂaws in the current system and procedure in order to demonstrate why it

is necessary to develop a new system capable of resolving existing obstacles that

students and educational institutions face when evaluating academic degree cre-

dentials, the author uses the example of a hypothetical situation. As an additional

advantage, this chapter examines questionnaires completed by professionals in the

ﬁeld of evaluating degree veriﬁcation processes and draws on their knowledge and

experience to restructure the scenarios and lay the groundwork for incorporating

the proposed design concept into the evaluation criteria.

4.1 How SSI can apply to design an IdM

It is a technique for managing digital identities that is based on concepts and

technology with the goal of handing control to students via the usage of self-

sovereign identity (SSI). At its most fundamental level, self-sovereign identity (SSI)

is a set of rules that regulate how identity and personal data should be preserved

on digital networks. SSI’s core concepts include identity management, distributed

computing, blockchain or Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), and cryptography

[85].

These concepts are frequently referenced in the web article The Path to Self-

Sovereign Identity. The content suggests a new relationship between individuals

and their digital identities based on ten fundamental principles [74]. The desire

to minimize vendor lock-in regarding data transfer and interchange is one of the

aspirational goals for individual rights in connection to data collected about them.

As we consider how to make academic records more accessible and participa-

tory, the architecture of SSI-type systems serves as a lens through which we can

consider how to make such systems more egalitarian, allowing students greater ac-

cess to and control over their academic records while still ensuring data integrity.

44 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

These initiatives have the potential to improve student identiﬁcation and empow-

erment while also enhancing educational institutions’ ability to educate and busi-

nesses’ ability to recruit qualiﬁed workers through the use of SSI-based techniques.

This article focuses on the user scenario, illustrating the importance of interop-

erable, individual-level data in improving student outcomes. The scenario illus-

trates how veriﬁable academic credentials might be presented to a foreign univer-

sity in order to get admission to a higher degree program. Additionally demon-

strates how veriﬁable and inter-operable academic records (together with future

diploma training) can result in more exact talent matching in subsequent public

or private sector employment. Service members who are students beneﬁt from

a more rapid integration into the workforce and greater levels of job satisfaction

in this case. As a result, organizations’ capacity to recruit qualiﬁed candidates

improves. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate how SSI techniques may

assure the ongoing veriﬁability of students’ records while also allowing students

to manage their own records and academic records.

While this study concentrated on SSI components relevant to students’ aca-

demic records, the ﬁndings should not be regarded as a comprehensive map of the

SSI terrain. The "Comprehensive Guide to Self-Sovereign Identity" [79] covers the

history, objectives, and present political climate of SSI.

4.2 Beneﬁts of using SSI for veriﬁcation system

When SSI-based technological solutions are implemented, a slew of signiﬁcant ben-

eﬁts ﬂow to students, institutions, and the broader ecosystem:

• The institution grants students the ability to control who has access to their

academic record(s), including speciﬁc components of their records, and when

they have access.

• Credentials are conﬁrmed and accessible regardless of the condition of the

originating organization (academic institutions) at the moment of authenti-

cation, as authentication is cryptographically secured, which is often done on

distributed ledgers.

• It is possible to verify students and local institutions online in a secure and

timely manner.

• When it comes to validating non-traditional accomplishments, veriﬁable cre-

dentials might be advantageous because they demonstrate learning across a

variety of contexts.

4.3. Scenario-based SSI 45

4.3 Scenario-based SSI

Using the Identity Management System for academic credential prioritized user

scenario described above, we can describe each position and the experience of a

student named Mohammad in an SSI environment when veriﬁed credentials are

utilized, as follows:

• Mohammad is a Bangladeshi college student who recently transferred from

a small coastal metropolitan area’s high school to a national college. He is

a student enrolled in a next-generation (digital curriculum) school. He

enrolled in an IT program to round out his education and get a sector-

recognized network management certiﬁcation. He sought and was admit-

ted to a university certiﬁcate program the following year, which included

an internship and industry certiﬁcation. He recently earned a certiﬁcation

as a result of completing his university degree, which included an intern-

ship. Outside of Bangladesh, his current interests include postgraduate

studies and employment opportunities in the ﬁelds of network adminis-

tration and cybersecurity.

Figure 4.1: VC Presentations for application to university programmes

The roles and interactions inside an SSI ecosystem are referred to as the "trust

triangle" because to the way it develops. Conﬁdence in the credentials’ issuer

instills trust in them, just as it does in the real world. This triangle is seen in

Figure 4.1, but it also illustrates how roles and VCs interact, which is why the

Veriﬁable Credential Lifecycle is frequently reffered for the VC’s data model [52],

[86]. The lifecycle diagram of a Veriﬁable Credential illustrates the numerous steps

it goes through, as well as the roles that execute speciﬁc activities at each level.

The method is described below in terms of a Veriﬁable Credential that serves as a

substitute for a college diploma. The issuer is a university, the holder is a student,

and the veriﬁer is a university’s admissions recruiter.

46 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

Educational institutions (issuers) begin issuing credentials to Mohammad (sub-

ject/holder) using an SSI-based system. Mohammad can store this information and

access it from any device using his mobile or web-based credential wallet/application.

By sending credentials along with metadata from his wallet to the local national

college, he ensures that his academic credentials have not been tampered with, are

real, and are in good standing. This is accomplished through the use of a veriﬁable

data registry. Mohammad’s application for enrolment has been authorized follow-

ing the national college’s assessment of his credentials. Mohammad would receive

accreditation from the national college after successfully completing tasks such as

ﬁnishing a course or earning a certiﬁcation, one of which would be in Information

Technology. This certiﬁcation, along with a few other carefully selected academic

qualiﬁcations, is added to Mohammad’s credentials wallet, which he organizes.

Finally, Mohammad applies for a university program that will recognize his qual-

iﬁcations using the same approach he used to obtain this certiﬁcation. While the

secondary school may be a member of a different veriﬁed data registry than the

national college, each registry’s objective is the same. Mohammad maintains a

Figure 4.2: Customized VC’s Presentation with Selective Disclosure to different Relying Parties.

personal credential record wallet that contains a variety of veriﬁed credentials,

including his school and college records, a computer technology industry certiﬁca-

tion (along with other industry certiﬁcations), internship records, and a certiﬁcate

from an accredited university program (see ﬁgure: 4.2). He can use his interopera-

ble credential wallet to create customised presentations of his credentials, which he

can utilize to apply to worldwide institutions and career markets. Except for the

4.4. Discussions with Experts: Q&A 47

presentation of credentials, the two potential veriﬁers/relying parties (foreign uni-

versity / talent recruiter) would follow the same veriﬁcation procedure as national

colleges and universities.

4.4 Discussions with Experts: Q&A

Apart from establishing theoretical groundwork, this section establishes a frame-

work for future research into the proposed design and evaluation approach. This

division is in charge of developing, administering, and analyzing a survey of ed-

ucational sector specialists. This strategy lays the groundwork for the subsequent

chapters. The following part will go into greater detail on how to put together the

questionnaire.

4.4.1 Questionnaire formulation

A questionnaire of experts is used to ensure that the work and its artifacts are not

based on speculation or guesswork, but on actual experience and expert judgment.

Along with emphasizing the User/Stakeholder Role Experience, it is critical to

include a list of veriﬁed SSI solutions as a secondary objective. Additionally, the

following factors should be considered: whether the solutions are suggested, what

selection criteria should be used, and whether components of the solutions are

currently underrepresented in the market.

Prior to conducting the interview, an exhaustive literature review was con-

ducted [37], [38], [47], [54], [56], [60], [61], [64], [65] and a search on GitHub for the

terms "veriﬁable credentials" and "self-sovereign identity." This proved to be a chal-

lenging endeavor, given that the literature typically discusses legacy or SDK-free

solutions, and occasionally even mixes in SSI networks. As an example, Sovrin was

frequently placed in the same side of the table as uPort as a Hyperledger network

[37], [47], [64], [65]. This may be perplexing for those interested in incorporating

SSI into their systems or service offerings. As a result, initiatives that could be

implemented in collaboration with particular organizations were initially rejected.

Following that, it was determined which stages of the veriﬁable credential lifecycle

[52] each solution might cover. This is critical for determining the feasibility of of-

fered solutions. This was accomplished by an analysis of the various alternatives’

websites and documentation, which frequently lack sufﬁcient information.

A more in-depth look at the issue of expert selection is provided once the ﬁrst

basic material has been covered in this section. With the author’s supervisor’s help,

author was able to learn about the GAIN perspective in the SSI community through

his supervisor’s recent participation in a workshop, which was really helpful. The

GAIN viewpoint on the SSI program, as well as subsequent technical discussions,

highlighted ﬁeld professionals as possible participants. In order to compile a list

48 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

of all the professionals who took part in the survey, author used this table along

with information gleaned from LinkedIn and other sources.

Name Organization Position

Eva Marie

Althoff

Schäfer

Aalborg University International Co-ordinator

Mr. Ziarat

Hossain

Khan

American International

University-Bangladesh

Ofﬁce of Students Affairs

Mohammad

Tanvir

Hossain

Renata Pharmaceutical

Limited-Bangladesh

Senior Ofﬁcer-HRD

4.4.2 Surveys purpose: Inquiry-based methods

It was determined that the questionnaire should be used based on the project’s

analytical progress. Given that the problem statement was analyzed based on the

roles played by entities that would use the system rather than on the technical

development of the identity management system, experts were selected based on

their roles as individuals who were responsible for evaluating students’ academic

records and performance.

While the project was analytical in nature and centered on the application of the

new SSI concept, technical standards were thoroughly deﬁned in order to develop

the scenario based on the conceptual design offered in the design chapter.

The meanings of the questions are based on the essential concepts introduced

at the outset of this section. In addition, just a small number of questions were

selected in order to speed up the process of answering them. It was because of

this, that the following question emerged:

• 1. What is the title of your position/job?

• 2. Are you currently working on anything that would alter the management

system used to verify international students’ domestic degree completion?

• 3. What value would you place on the existing system’s toolkit and ﬂexibility

for successfully implementing new technology?

• 4. What additions or modiﬁcations would you make in light of previous

incidents?

• 5. Which solutions would you choose and why if you were in charge of a

company looking to integrate veriﬁcation systems into their products?

4.4. Discussions with Experts: Q&A 49

• 6. Which ones would you choose not to utilize, and why?

• 7. What factors do you believe are critical when evaluating a system for

implementing Veriﬁable Credentials/academic records?

• 8. What do you believe are the most prevalent issues that today’s institutional

solutions face?

• 9. Is there anything more you wish to say?

Following completion of the preparations, the deﬁned questions were forwarded

to the specialists on the list, who responded swiftly and competently. The follow-

ing section will discuss the administration of the questionnaire and the receipt of

responses.

4.4.3 Q&A: Analysis

The questionnaire was meant to be completed by email or video conference to suit

busy individuals. The high response rate was attributed to qualiﬁed candidates for

expert roles. Through open-ended inquiries, participants can express themselves

freely. We received three comprehensive responses after contacting each of the four

individuals. Eva Marie Althoff Schäfer, Ziarat Hossain Khan, and Mohammad

Tanvir Hossain were among those present. Appendix A enlisted the questions to-

gether where Appendix B summarizes the responses of each participant, including

the following:

• 1. What is the title of your position/job? International Coordinator, Human

Resource, Admission Controller.

• 2. Are you currently working on anything that would alter the management system

used to verify international students’ domestic degree completion? Government

projects, adaptation, new ﬁeld of technologies.

• 3. What value would you place on the existing system’s toolkit and ﬂexibility for

successfully implementing new technology? public registry, trust, collaboration.

• 4. What additions or modiﬁcations would you make in light of previous incidents?

control, record, database, attestation, veriﬁcation.

• 5. Which solutions would you choose and why if you were in charge of a com-

pany looking to integrate veriﬁcation systems into their products? UKNaric, online

veriﬁcation, direct collaboration between organization, major player, stake-

holders.

• 6. Which ones would you choose not to utilize, and why? Paper based record,

attesting method, translated certiﬁcate.

50 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

• 7. What factors do you believe are critical when evaluating a system for imple-

menting Veriﬁable Credentials/academic records? Universal system and record,

interoperability between entities.

• 8. What do you believe are the most prevalent issues that today’s institutional solu-

tions face? vast amount of application, time, justiﬁcation method.

• 9. Is there anything more you wish to say? ﬂexibility, interoperability, interna-

tional collaboration.

4.5 Existing admissions procedures in foreign institutions

Universities in Denmark have an administrative system that enables students to

conveniently register for classes, view exam results, and generate multiple tran-

scripts. The university’s administration included all pertinent study information

for students on that page. Students can easily obtain printed academic transcripts,

but they must contact the study secretary if they need the transcripts conﬁrmed

for employment purposes. In the case of personal data, information such as an

address or a contact medium that has been retrieved from the Danish National

Registration Ofﬁce can be revised only if the relevant information is updated in the

Danish National Registration Ofﬁce. That facility provided the system with a stu-

dent’s personal information without altering the student’s identity. However, the

report once again concentrates on academic credentials, which have little impact

on the Danish National Registration Ofﬁce. Additionally, international students in-

terested in pursuing a higher degree in Denmark must use the Danish Agency for

Education and Research’s Application Portal to create a proﬁle and apply to gradu-

ate programs at various education institutions in Denmark. International students

were required to provide documentation of past educational degrees and records

without going through any veriﬁcation process. However, once a student has en-

rolled in a course, his or her educational record is shared with NemID-CPR. One

method of verifying the degree holder is through the use of the degree holder’s

Civil Registration Number. However, it is not internationally recognized because

CPR has limited value to a student studying in a different country.

When looking at the Scenario from this perspective, , Mohammad is a Bangladeshi

student with no unique identifying number other than his passport, which veriﬁes

his citizenship. Additionally, his passport number may be utilized to facilitate visa

processing in accordance with international regulations and identiﬁcation veriﬁca-

tion, but claiming to own an academic diploma is unjustiﬁable. According to the

illustration, Mohammad graduated from a university approved by the local gov-

ernment, which may be veriﬁed by cross-checking university registration informa-

tion with that of the local government. However, Mohammad’s civic identiﬁcation

information remains absent.

4.6. Expected risk of using existing veriﬁcation system and responses 51

Figure 4.3: Application Portal Denmark

In Germany, applying for higher degree admissions follows a similar procedure

as in the United States. International students applying to German universities

from other countries must send their application materials via postal or air mail.

In the same way, a credential does not provide any clariﬁcation on the identity of

an individual in terms of his civil identity.

When Mohammad was admitted to a university program in Bangladesh upon

completion of higher secondary school, he was required to surrender his original

academic transcript to university ofﬁcials in exchange for a four-year hold. This

was because he was required to withdraw from all other educational programs

while enrolled in one.

4.6 Expected risk of using existing veriﬁcation system and

responses

To demonstrate how SSI can alleviate some of the issues associated with student

academic record systems, the following user scenarios are examined: Beginning

with an assessment of potential dangers to a student’s agency and progressing

to areas where these issues may result in regulatory considerations, employment

opportunities and foreign university entrance should be pursued. Numerous risk

reduction approaches are also provided, including technical, legislative, and archi-

tectural techniques.

The User Scenario details Mohammad’s experience as a university graduate

transitioning from a science background. Along with looking for jobs in his own

country, Mohammad is exploring options to study at international universities in

52 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

Figure 4.4: Academic Credential without Civil Identiﬁcation

a more specialized topic. Mohammad holds a bachelor’s degree in science and is

currently enrolled in a university-level certiﬁcation program. He is responsible for

connecting with a number of systems, utilizing his academic credential record to

track his successes and determine which ones to share with other schools. Numer-

ous instances of such systems are as follows:

• Tools for navigating career

• System(s) for Recruiting/Applicant Tracking

• System(s) for Assessment

• System(s) for Background Checks

• System(s) for Human Resource Information System

• System(s) for Data Collaboration

4.6.1 Expected Risk

This report examines the dangers Mohammad may face as a result of his usage of

these technologies, including discrimination, manipulation, excessive disclosure,

4.6. Expected risk of using existing veriﬁcation system and responses 53

Figure 4.5: Application Portal Germany

tracking, and lock-in/lock-out. Case studies are used to illustrate the ﬁndings.

The report’s objective was to provide plausible responses to each risk segment

utilizing both the SSI and privacy-focused frameworks, which are then outlined in

detail in the next section.

Generally, the most effective method of mitigating these hazards in the conven-

tional learning environment is through legislation and regulation. Family Educa-

tional Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation

(GDPR) are two examples. Decentralized approaches are preferred over centralized

approaches in the ﬁeld of SSI. The SSI approaches are not designed to replace reg-

ulations or the rule of law, but to supplement them by providing relief in instances

where the rules are not consistently enforced.

4.6.2 Discrimination

In the scenario outlined above, service providers such as academic institutions and

labor market ﬁrms have access to sensitive information. As a result, they are able

to discriminate on the basis of gender, ethnicity, age, and other legally protected

characteristics.

Examples include machine learning algorithms that perpetuate biases inherent

in training data, frequently without the well-intentioned authors of such optimiza-

tion algorithms being aware of it. Offering "tailored recommendations" to students

also means excluding those who do not meet the criteria for the customised offer,

which may result in unintentional bias and illegal discrimination on the part of the

institution. For example, when Scandinavian graduates are awarded higher man-

agement or academic positions, they are reafﬁrming the privileges of graduates

of Scandinavian schools while discriminating against groups that are underrepre-

sented among Scandinavian graduates. While the term "Scandinavian graduate" is

never mentioned explicitly in the training data, machine learning algorithms might

"learn" to favor Scandinavian grads.

As a result of systems that are not built to be inclusive from the beginning,

discrimination might arise, as well. Accessibility, usability, and inclusivity are all

54 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

listed as crucial concerns by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [27] when

evaluating how users will interface with websites and services.

Responses

• Selective Disclosure

• Data Minimization

• Governance frameworks

• Embedded identity prooﬁng attributes

4.6.3 Manipulation

For ﬁrms that create job exploration tools, student welfare may be a secondary

consideration. They will need to upgrade their system to better serve paying con-

sumers if their business model is based on the interests of third parties, as is the

case with the various international organizations outlined in the case section of

the introduction chapter. If the majority of customers are advertising and recruit-

ing ﬁrms, the system may evolve to favor the interests of the customers. If left

unchecked, algorithmic decision making may provide features and designs that

enrich tool manufacturers at the expense of students.

Responses

• Elective Computation

• Information ﬁduciaries

4.6.4 Over Disclosure

When information is sought or shared, there is always the risk of revealing more

than is necessary. When a driver’s license with a person’s address is used to pur-

chase a product that can only be purchased by persons who are at least eighteen

years old. As an alternative method of demonstrating mastery, students may sub-

mit an unedited transcript of their educational history, which often includes the

entirety of their courses at the institution they are applying to.

Responses

• Selective Disclosure

• Progressive Disclosure

4.6. Expected risk of using existing veriﬁcation system and responses 55

• Embedded identity prooﬁng attributes

• Data Minimization

4.6.5 Tracking

It is typical to contact the original submitter of the request to ascertain the status of

the request. A police ofﬁcer, for example, may conduct real-time data comparisons

of a driver’s license to data stored by the Department of Motor Vehicles during

a trafﬁc stop. Similarly, businesses can contact the awarding body (or any rep-

utable third party) to ascertain whether candidates have successfully ﬁnished their

degrees or certiﬁcates. Coordinating a student’s application to a foreign college

necessitates collaboration with the student’s home university in order to validate

academic qualiﬁcations.

Contacting the original issuer to ascertain the most recent status is not unrea-

sonable, and may even be required by legislation or industry standards if done in

this manner. Privacy concerns have arisen as a result of an over-reliance on systems

that query a single central database, as records become more accessible via digi-

tal technologies. Educational institutions and service providers are not required

by law to know where students post their academic achievements. Students run

the risk of their actions being detected by unauthorized individuals if a solution

requires the school to validate their accomplishments.

Responses

• Veriﬁable credentials

• Decentralized identiﬁers

• Decentralized veriﬁable data registries

• Privacy-preserving Credential Status

4.6.6 Vendor Lock-In

Along with the fear of being tracked by centralized veriﬁcation systems, students

face the potential of being unable to utilize their credentials once obtained. Stu-

dents and other parties relying on credentials lose their value if the process of

conﬁrming credentials is dependent on unavailable third-party services. Addi-

tional hazards associated with relying on digital credentials include the credential

being lost or the student being unable to utilize the credential successfully due to

a name change.

56 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

Responses

• Veriﬁable credentials

• Decentralized identiﬁers

• Decentralized veriﬁable data registries

• Privacy-promoting credential status checks

• Personal data store

• Governance frameworks

4.7 Response Analysis

4.7.1 Veriﬁable Credentials

Veriﬁable Credentials, with their standard, lightweight data architecture, are a crit-

ical enabler of interoperability, as they provide a declaration of veriﬁable authen-

ticity. Depending on the conditions and the particular scenario, a diverse range of

data standards can be represented.

When utilizing Veriﬁable Credentials, one can rely on ﬂexible proof (veriﬁca-

tion) methods to ensure that cryptographically secure credentials are produced and

that the issuing institution stands behind the credentials’ declarations. There are

a variety of credential status methods available that enable institutions to suspend

or revoke credentials on an as-needed basis. For example, both selected disclo-

sure and zero-knowledge proofs can be used in both minimum and progressive

disclosure systems, as well as hybrid disclosure systems.

Veriﬁable credentials data models beneﬁt all processes in this case of user sce-

nario because they enable the expression of credentials in a single format, ease

portability and interoperability between systems, and aid in the prevention of lock-

in.

4.7.2 Decentralized Identiﬁers

DIDs(Decentralized Identiﬁers) enable academic institutions and students to build

their identities independently of a central, trusted third party, which is one of their

key objectives. When a school declares bankruptcy or consolidates, certain kinds of

decentralized identiﬁcation continue to be utilized even after the institution ceases

to exist. Individuals may beneﬁt from the ability to preserve their educational

records for the remainder of their lives if the cryptographic material establishing

4.7. Response Analysis 57

ownership of an identiﬁer is updateable. Individuals and institutions alike may in-

dependently verify the encryption of their decentralized IDs, which is a signiﬁcant

beneﬁt.

As a result, students can maintain their privacy and ﬂexibility across platforms

by employing DIDs rather than a single, unique identity.

4.7.3 Decentralized Veriﬁable Data Registries

When employing decentralized veriﬁable data registries, such as revocation lists, to

broadcast the status of suspended or revoked credentials, there is no need to con-

tact the original issuing authority. There are numerous approaches to decentralize

an SSI system through the use of blockchains (or distributed ledger technologies,

such as DLT). When this strategy is employed, a single point of failure is less likely

to occur; for example, the value of the information may stay intact even if the in-

stitution that provided the credentials goes out of business or if the system that

produced them goes ofﬂine as a result.

In the user scenario, by plotting decentralized veriﬁable data registries creden-

tials can be examined by the recruitment manager, foreign recruiter, or interna-

tional admission coordinator, thus improving trust in the process of advancing the

candidate to an on-site interview.

4.7.4 Privacy-Preserving Credential Status Check

A credential status check that safeguards personal information is used to ascertain

the current state of a credential without disclosing any personal information to the

credential’s original issuer. The most popular method of determining the authen-

ticity of a credential ID is to contact the issuer directly, which is a simple yet widely

used alternative. As a side effect, the issuer receives information about the sub-

ject’s identiﬁcation, which is frequently in the form of a reference to a background

check ﬁrm or institution.

According to a student’s academic context, this means an education institution

is certain that a speciﬁc student is making inquiries about veriﬁcation requests,

which means that the institution can reveal which colleges and companies the stu-

dent has been communicating. In order to avoid this problem, privacy-enhancing

checks allow veriﬁcation to take place without the disclosure of any identifying

or personally identiﬁable information (PII). The following chapter focuses on a

variety of different implementations.

4.7.5 Personal Data Stores

The personal data store of an individual is a collection of data repositories that can

be accessed and shared only by the individual who has access to them. Individuals

58 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

may preserve complete control over these repositories or they may be disclosed in

such a way that the individual retains control. Personal blogs, for example, are

frequent data repositories with limited storage space. Individuals have created

writings that have been published publicly and privately. On the other hand, social

networking sites (such as Facebook and Twitter) are highly structured, ad hoc data

storage services such as Dropbox and Google Drive.

Maintaining credentials and accessing them is critical, regardless of where they

are stored, for students. This might be a centralized service that gathers credentials

from a variety of sources and provides a graphical user interface for curating and

showing many representations of the same information to the user. In addition,

it is probable that many services (including those supplied by enterprises and

academic institutions) provide common APIs that allow employees and students

to dynamically export certain accomplishments via a URL on a digital résumé,

allowing them to stand out in the crowd.

The usage of personal data stores in the user scenario allows Mohammad to

give veriﬁable application data with the least amount of duplication of effort.

4.7.6 Selective Disclosure

By utilizing cryptographic or structural techniques, an individual can selectively

disclose a subset of a much larger data collection. This is referred to as "selective

disclosure." For example, selective academic records permit students to disclose in-

formation about their academic standing, start and end dates, but not about their

courses or tuition payments. Again, a student’s selective disclosure employment

record enables him or her to identify their employment position, start and end

dates, and experiences without disclosing job responsibilities or salary... One way

to achieve selective disclosure through technology is to issue a series of oversam-

pled, ﬁne-grained statements from which a student can choose which facts to re-

veal, using techniques ranging from advanced techniques (such as zero knowledge

proofs and redaction signatures) to the brute-force method.

While presenting information selectively does not prohibit later questions, it is

critical to keep in mind that additional information may be asked from the student.

Rather than requiring the subject of the information to engage in an all-or-nothing

interaction, such as revealing the entire driver’s license when just the age informa-

tion is necessary, it allows the subject of the information to choose which data to

reveal and which to remain private. Minimal disclosure regulations compel stu-

dents to supply only the bare minimum information; in exchange, students use

selective disclosure to disclose only the information requested.

Mohammad can disclose only the information requested by the admission re-

cruiting/applicant tracking system at the moment of disclosure while employing

selective disclosure in the user scenario.

4.7. Response Analysis 59

4.7.7 Elective Computation

The term "elective computation" refers to the procedure through which a person

desires that their personal information be processed on their behalf. These "auto-

mated" enhancements frequently contradict this notion by adopting an unethical

paternalistic attitude toward customers’ "best interests." Google’s search results

are an example of elective computation, as they are determined by explicit user

requests rather than machine learning. For the majority of individuals, seeing rel-

evant results on the current search results page is expected. Everything is now

evident. In other words, it is the objective. Consider how an individual feels when

they are "retargeted" with advertisements for things they previously viewed on

other websites as a result of ubiquitous advertising technology.

Mohammad must speciﬁcally direct the career navigation tool and admissions

website to conduct this search for roles and courses that meet his background

in the situation outlined above. If not handled effectively and responsibly, the

combination of professional and educational aims may result in privacy violations

such as discrimination.

4.7.8 Progressive Disclosure

The progression of disclosure involves disclosing less and less information as the

value proposition becomes clearer, the connection deepens, and the parties’ trust

grows. When it comes to internet shopping, the vast majority of ﬁrms do not re-

quire membership or a credit card to conduct business. People rarely begin by

informing a business of their requirements, but they routinely click on links and

enter search phrases indicating an interest in particular products. When a buyer is

ready to purchase something, he or she must provide payment and shipping infor-

mation. As a result, the vast majority of internet businesses default to progressive

disclosure.

This means that regardless of where Mohammad attended school, the grades

he earned, or the dates they were earned, the information shared with applicant

tracking and admission portal systems would initially be limited to the bare min-

imum—for example, attestation of Mohammad’s completed degree in a speciﬁc

ﬁeld or certiﬁcations earned. Mohammad may be required to make more disclo-

sures throughout the application process as he feels more comfortable with the

procedure. Personal data gathering can be delayed until later in the hiring or re-

cruiting process, and in certain cases, until after an offer of employment or admis-

sion has been extended, "until additional documentation is obtained," if necessary.

Individuals can avoid discrimination by concealing personal information such as

their name, age, and even their school attendance.

60 Chapter 4. Questionnaires and Analysis

4.7.9 Embedded Identity Prooﬁng Attributes

Even if advanced selective disclosure techniques are available, a credential may be

essential and appropriate for exposing personally identiﬁable information (PII). By

examining the document itself, a human observer can assess whether or not the

individual presenting the document is the same person who has been issued it in

the ﬁrst place. Additionally, in addition to the holograms and microprinting on

the ID card, a person can validate an individual’s photo, age, eyes, hair, and other

"soft" biometrics such as ﬁngerprints.

When employers and admission recruiters incorporate identity prooﬁng char-

acteristics into a given credential and combine them with limited and selective

disclosure, employers and admission recruiters can more easily associate the cre-

dential with a new employment or admittance offer. By law, students must submit

their full legal name, as well as any supporting documentation, when completing

admissions and employment paperwork. If the embedding qualities are disclosed

selectively and requested only when absolutely necessary (minimal exposure), as

in a progressive disclosure information exchange method, it is permissible to com-

pare one’s own name to the name of a credential.

When the approach is employed in the user scenario, it is possible to conduct

efﬁcient background checks inside the same credential exchange operations as be-

fore.

4.7.10 Data Minimization

Data minimization, as the name implies, is the practice of seeking only the infor-

mation essential to complete a transaction. Without requiring the customer’s age,

pizza orders can be placed over the phone; nevertheless, the clerk will need to

know the customer’s location. When service providers request more information

than is necessary, consumers become locked in a vicious circle, unable to use the

service or agreeing to an unacceptable risk of harm. This emphasis on requiring

only the bare minimum information at each point of the connection is synonymous

with progressive disclosure in that it emphasizes the importance of requiring only

the bare minimum information at each stage.

Encryption and data security concerns associated with storing personally iden-

tiﬁable information (PII) that may be "exposed to unauthorized access or use" are

noted as critical privacy considerations in NIST’s "Digital Identity Guidelines: En-

rollment and Identity Prooﬁng" [32]. Limiting data collection "encourages conﬁ-

dence in the identity prooﬁng process," thereby mitigating this vulnerability.

By limiting the amount of data collected, Mohammad from the user scenario

can safeguard his privacy while still establishing trust in the system.

4.8. Security Challenges 61

4.7.11 Information Fiduciaries

Informatics ﬁduciaries are individuals who are legally bound to act in the best

interests of others when it comes to the acquisition, processing, and distribution

of personal information. Those who are legally required to collect, store, and dis-

seminate personal information are referred to as data controllers. To assist pupils

in comprehending knowledge that is too difﬁcult for them to grasp, analogous to

the ﬁduciary obligations that increase society’s trust in professionals such as doc-

tors, lawyers, and accountants. Career navigation software vendors and admission

portal providers could form a ﬁduciary relationship, pledging to put students’

interests ahead of their own. As a result, there would be less concern about ser-

vice misuse, such as scope creep, which sometimes favors marketing and paying

clients (such as recruiters) at the expense of individual students’ rights and inter-

ests. Fiduciaries are not a panacea for dishonest actors; lawsuits alleging wrong-

doing are made for a reason. For persons who, like students, rely on the good

faith of professional service providers to look out for their best interests, the use of

ﬁduciaries to resolve conﬂicts of interest is well established.

4.7.12 Governance Frameworks

The structures, roles, and rules of an organization or government are frequently

referred to as the "governance framework." Due to the cross-domain application of

SSI techniques, governance frameworks are frequently used to bridge trust gaps

across educational institutions, government organizations, and ﬁnancial institu-

tions. Governing frameworks contribute to the reduction of failure points by en-

suring that records are kept in interoperable formats, are available to students, and

adhere to privacy and other best practices to avoid bias throughout the application

process.

4.8 Security Challenges

Security audits, threat assessments, and privacy and data protection impact assess-

ments, to name a few, are required for any new technical stack, among other things.

Existing threats are subject to being displaced by new ones in the near future. For

example, in a setting where the issuer is not required to be consulted, issuing-

side threats may be permissible under certain circumstances. Solutions based on

purpose-built blockchains may offer whole new security issues that have not yet

been addressed. When it comes to new threat models and mitigation measures,

stakeholders should proceed with extreme caution.

Chapter 5

Conceptual Design Proposal

A credential is a collection of claims (or statements about a subject) issued by an

issuer. It is a foundational SSI concept. A credential may take the form of a diploma

or certiﬁcate, as well as a license or digital badge, but is not limited to these. The

SSI strategy, on the other hand, is based on the convergence of standards and

encryption, distributed ledgers, and front-end applications that enable computers

to authenticate credentials on their own. We’ll discuss how credentials are veriﬁed

in an SSI environment in the following section, including the roles and human

experience that are required.

This chapter covers the design model for the identity management system,

which is based on the SSI concept and is intended to provide a means for ver-

ifying students’ academic success in foreign institutions as well as in the labor

market. A student must ﬁrst enroll in an academic program at his or her selected

university in order for this to occur. In this case, both the institution and the stu-

dents play key roles in the establishment of their digital identities through the use

of a decentralized identity management system. It was as a result of this that the

design process was separated into three discrete stages (see Figure:5.1 ).

5.1 Stage one: Using DID to establish identity

A decentralized identiﬁer has been devised to meet the needs of an SSI system’s

IDs in a draft proposal from the World Wide Web Consortium. They can be gen-

erated independently of a centralized authority by students and institutions, and

they can be controlled through the use of cryptographic evidence to establish their

legitimacy. These IDs are globally unique and are not location-speciﬁc.

The advantages of acquiring DID are discussed in the following paragraphs

[86]:

• DIDs do not need to be updated because they do not have a lifecycle or

expiration date.

64 Chapter 5. Conceptual Design Proposal

Figure 5.1: Procedural stages of design

• By resolving DIDs, additional information can be retrieved.

• DIDs can be demonstrated to be under the control of their owners at any time

through cryptography. Using a public and private key pair, this can be done.

• Without the help of a central authority, a DID can be issued or produced.

Figure 5.2 displays the DID architecture in its entirety, including all of its compo-

nents and relationships, to show how DIDs work between the institution and the

student.

5.2 Stage two: Channel between institution and student

By utilizing a Decentralized Identiﬁer, we can establish a connection between the

local institution and the student.

In the ﬁgure 5.2 at the top, the DID subject is denoted by the DID, which can

be a student. The ’did:example:190392-4841’ is an example of a three-part DID.

First, the identiﬁer schema is described, followed by an example of how to use the

DID method. Finally, the third section, ’190392-4841,’ is an identiﬁer for students

speciﬁc to the DID method that can be used to resolve the DID document in this

case - a veriﬁable credential for academic records using the DID method." Because

5.2. Stage two: Channel between institution and student 65

Figure 5.2: Establishing a trustworthy link between the school and the student in order to obtain

academic qualiﬁcations

of their location independence, DIDs can be stored in a variety of Veriﬁable Data

Registries, including blockchains, decentralized ﬁle systems, and even web servers.

Create, resolve, update and deactivate DIDs and their relevant DID documents

(credential records and location) in a speciﬁed data registry using the DID method

(did:example). For DID methods that don’t require a Veriﬁable Data Registry, such

as did:key or DID-URL, the public key that can be used to derive the DID document

is wrapped in a cryptographic wrapper [86]. For DID methods that use blockchains

or layers built on top of them as a Veriﬁable Data Registry, however, the public key

is wrapped in a cryptographic wrapper as well. Various academic records linked

with DID-Students are described in the DID document, which also speciﬁes how

students can interact with veriﬁcation methods, public keys, and service endpoints

(such as a local database of University Record ﬁles). Users can be directed to

speciﬁc resources inside a DID document using DIDs linked to routes. DID URLs

are a type of URL. The accompanying ﬁgure 5.3 depicts a sample DID document

[74]

The presentation concludes with Figure 5.2, which illustrates an academic insti-

tution’s DID controller. This organization has been authorized to modify the DID

document. This is not always the case, though. Generally, the DID controller and

subject are the same individual (parent-child relationship) [74]. The World Wide

Web Consortium’s adoption of the DID standard enables the use of decentralized

66 Chapter 5. Conceptual Design Proposal

Figure 5.3: Documents in the DID format

IDs in SSI situations. It is possible to use DIDs and veriﬁed credentials to represent

a degree credential to a foreign university or talent market, as well as to act as the

foundation for an SSI.

5.3 Stage three: Presenting academic records in credential

form

When used in conjunction with DIDs, a data model is necessary to reﬂect a stu-

dent’s academic record consistently, despite the fact that DIDs were formed as

distinct and independent students. To accomplish this, the World Wide Web Con-

sortium (W3C) developed the Veriﬁable Credential (VC) standard (see chapter 3).

VCs can be used to protect the integrity and validity of academic institutions by

representing them in a tamper-evident manner. The three basic components of a

VC are depicted in Figure 3.2, each of which is written in JSON-LD format [52].

When it comes to credential information, factors such as location, expiration

date, type of degree issued, and revocation process can be deﬁned. These ele-

ments can be utilized to identify whether or not the status of a credential has been

revoked. As a result, the school may deﬁne a set of claims, which may include

assertions regarding the student’s academic qualiﬁcations. Degree certiﬁcates can

be veriﬁed using cryptographic proof such as JSON Web Tokens or JSON Linked

5.3. Stage three: Presenting academic records in credential form 67

Data, which can be used to prove their legitimacy [52].

Figure 5.4: Degree records in credential form.

To fully comprehend this ﬁgure 5.4, it is critical to keep the following in mind:

A context deﬁnition provides as a jumping-off point for the certiﬁcation process’s

semantic terms. Degree certiﬁcates are included in this collection, together with

the issuing institution’s DID and date metadata. The "credentialSubject" object con-

tains detailed information on the student’s DID and degree status. Additionally,

the DID and VC criteria are inextricably linked, as a DID that uniquely identiﬁes

an institution and its students serves as the foundation for the VC criterion. The

proof that follows will rely heavily on the public-private key pair associated with

the institution’s DID. Due to its association with its DID, an institution can use

its DID private key to authenticate the signature and credential associated with

Linked Data.

Veriﬁable Presentations (VPs) are also a crucial part of the standard’s architec-

ture (see Chapter 3 and Figure 3.2). There will be no loss of cryptographic proofs

68 Chapter 5. Conceptual Design Proposal

Figure 5.5: Credential presentation format to relying parties

when a student with a Veriﬁable Credentials(VCs) submits in a veriﬁable presenta-

tion form to a foreign institution or company. Using this method has a wide variety

of advantages. Students, on the other hand, have the option of choose which cre-

dentials they wish to make public, and they are already demonstrating ownership

by obtaining the credentials in the ﬁrst place. Figure 5.5 shows the format of the

Veriﬁable Presentation in a concrete manner [52].

A metadata attribute can have attributes such as context, type, and expiration

time, just like in the previous two examples (see ﬁgure 3.2 and 5.5). This is fol-

lowed by an alphabetical list of the degrees and certiﬁcates that will be conferred.

Finally, the student’s DID private key is used to produce a cryptographic proof.

As well as guaranteeing that the credentials were provided by the correct DID stu-

dent, this safeguards the presentation’s integrity. An additional layer of protection

against replay attacks can be provided by embedding aspects of the challenge and

domain into the proof. This prevents an attacker from delivering the intercepted

presentation to another veriﬁer without their permission [52].

5.4 SSI’s Functional aspects and interaction between enti-

ties

This section goes into greater depth on a number of the SSI’s functional aspects. It

is for this reason that the roles and interactions within an SSI system are outlined

in detail. Participants in an SSI ecosystem can take on one of three fundamental

5.4. SSI’s Functional aspects and interaction between entities 69

roles: issuer, veriﬁer, or holder, each of which has its own set of responsibilities.

Subsection 3.1.1 provides a high-level overview of these concepts, which are now

incorporated into the VC standard.

In an SSI ecosystem, ﬁve critical functions exist: (see section 3.1.1)

• Holder

• Issuer

• Subject

• Veriﬁer/Relying Party

• Veriﬁable Data Registry

Figure 5.6: The roles and responsibilily of SSI Ecosystem [49]

This form of ecosystem is based on the provision of independently veriﬁable

credentials. A third party talent recruiter or foreign institution may rely on the

student’s credentials (in the form of a veriﬁed presentation). To verify credentials,

one of the most prevalent scenarios is for the trusting party to employ a standard-

based veriﬁcation protocol (implemented by software/services). As a result, a

veriﬁed data registry maintains information about both the degree record creden-

tial’s state and the issuing institution’s cryptographic keys. Issuers may control

the lifecycle of a credential and demonstrate which credentials have been validated

without relying on any third parties. Credential veriﬁcation requires a paradigm

shift to place the student at the center of the credential exchange process. This can

occur in a variety of ways:

70 Chapter 5. Conceptual Design Proposal

• It is the issuing institution authority’s duty to establish a link with and beneﬁt

from the student/record holder.

• In an interoperable academic record wallet/app, a mobile or web-based unique

identiﬁcation (DID) is used to store the student’s credentials. One of two

things can happen: either the student or the degree holder presents or the

relying party (employer or academic institution) requests a credential, either

through a wallet, mobile app (or both) or using any portal.

• Following that, the dependent party aka foreign institution or talent recruiter

must begin the veriﬁcation procedure (through a code library or service

provider).

• A third-party service may have tampered with the credential, which is deter-

mined (typically via a cryptographic signature).

• The legitimacy of the identiﬁcation document is checked (i.e., conﬁrms that

the institution who provides the assertion for the student is a known party

and credible for the assertions made in the claims). As an example, a certiﬁed

data register (explained later section) can be used in this comparison.

• By comparing the credential to an instance of a reliable data registry, this

check ensures its validity (that is, it has not been revoked).

Apart from third parties like as issuers and reliant parties, as illustrated in the

SSI ecosystem diagram above(Figure: 5.6), credential holders often maintain com-

plete control over how their credentials are maintained and shared. Credential

hosting services are provided by a recognized issuer or third party (public or per-

missioned : detailed later section). Veriﬁcation is now possible without contacting

the issuing institution on a technical level. By utilizing a validated data registry

during the veriﬁcation process, a school authority can also keep control over the

state of the credentials it offers (valid or revoked).

Using the trust model outlined above (ﬁgure 5.6), as well as recognized stan-

dards and technology(see chapter 3), this method is applied to the user scenario

in the next section and results in the development of the proposed system that

allows entities (local and international institution and organizations) to form trust

through real-world interactions.

5.5 Setting up Scenario to create conﬁdence between enti-

ties

The analysis chapter gave a scenario involving a student named Mohammad who

has earned a degree in his home country and want to pursue a further degree

5.6. SSI for Student’s Academic Record System 71

in a foreign university along with career opportunities in his ﬁeld of study. This

chapter discusses the design paradigm for how institutions and students interact

(between entities : issuer and holder). Additionally, this section discusses how to

convey an academic certiﬁcation to another organization (institution or employ-

ment recruiter: Relying parties). With this knowledge, the scenario is described

in which Mohammad obtains his transcript from his university/institution and,

using the identical technique outlined below, submits his academic credentials to

third parties.

If local and national institution A wishes to send a credential to Mohammad,

a JSON message is generated and obtained from Mohammad’s DID record. As a

result, Mohammad’s public key and a messaging endpoint are both required by

institution A. Mohammad is the only person who can decipher the encrypted tran-

script, and this can only be done through the later approach. For further security,

the private key generated by institution A is used to encrypt and sign the transcript.

This method allows Mohammad to conﬁrm the authenticity and provenance of the

transcripts. Depending on the destination and route, the transcript can be sent in

a single trip or spread out across several iterations. Various routing-speciﬁc in-

formation is incorporated into the standard to do this. When Mohammad uses

his private key and the institution’s (A) public key to decrypt and authenticate his

academic transcript, he can now complete his degree. Even if Mohammad’s ﬁrst

application was successful, the same method may be used for a second application

to another foreign institution or employment market.

5.6 SSI for Student’s Academic Record System

Of course, additional SSI lessons can be applied to students’ academic record sys-

tems in order to assist them in improving their overall academic performance. This

investigation identiﬁed potential dangers that might be minimized in part by the

application of SSI approaches in a particular user context. The self-sovereignty

notion seeks to develop an understanding of how current identity systems might

be designed to respect an individual’s innate dignity as a person. To implement

the policy, there must be a constant interchange of ideas between the policy’s ar-

chitects, regulators, and administrators. While evaluating the principles of SSI

for employers, educators, and institutions, students and recent graduates will un-

doubtedly gain new ideas and strategies. Existing systems, the paper states, will

eventually include these concepts. By accumulating all of this knowledge, it is

feasible to develop SSI-speciﬁc hiring procedures for both job markets and school

admissions departments.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

A innovative approach to digital identity, "self-sovereign identity" has recently ac-

quired prominence. Theses aim to offer an overview of the existing identity veri-

ﬁcation systems for students and their records of academic certiﬁcates in addition

to developing a novel approach for the evaluation of these systems and their ﬂaw

identiﬁcation. As a result, a conceptual design study was established to evaluate

these ideas, and it was based on experts’ interviews, real-world experience and the

credential lifecycle. This work not only ﬁlls a void, but it also adds to the existing

body of knowledge. Only a few notable exceptions to this rule have been found in

the literature, which has traditionally focused on fundamental research, with little

attention made to the practical challenges of existing solutions.

The Veriﬁable Credential lifecycle was also the subject of a poll of specialists in

order to get an overview of the various results or solutions currently on the market

and their suitability for dealing with it. Using a questionnaire, three experts from

the institution and the talent market who engage with students to evaluate their

achievement completed and provided comments for chapters 4 and 5. To ensure

that the design proposal in the SSI ﬁeld would be followed up on, it was helpful to

have the support of a professional in examining and analyzing current solutions.

Based on expert advice and practical experience, a new user-oriented evalua-

tion method was devised. It was necessary to seek the advice of experts in the

ﬁeld in order to identify the most crucial criteria for SSI solutions. Research and

development of a proposed design model that incorporates three of the choices

was also conducted. As a result, the ﬁve criteria of usability, adaptability, oper-

ability, resilience, and involvement were created. Every single one of these criteria

can be used to answer a speciﬁc evaluation issue in the real world. This is the ﬁrst

time that a role-based approach has been used to investigate, design, and evaluate

SSI solutions. However, while some solutions are ready for production, the ﬁeld’s

lack of standards, as indicated by its infancy, continues to impede many of these

solutions from being implemented.

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Appendix A

Questionnaires

The set of questions was enumerated here, and the expert responses are included

in Appendix B.

• 1. What is the title of your position/job?

• 2. Are you currently working on anything that would alter the management

system used to verify international students’ domestic degree completion?

• 3. What value would you place on the existing system’s toolkit and ﬂexibility

for successfully implementing new technology?

• 4. What additions or modiﬁcations would you make in light of previous

incidents?

• 5. Which solutions would you choose and why if you were in charge of a

company looking to integrate veriﬁcation systems into their products?

• 6. Which ones would you choose not to utilize, and why?

• 7. What factors do you believe are critical when evaluating a system for

implementing Veriﬁable Credentials/academic records?

• 8. What do you believe are the most prevalent issues that today’s institutional

solutions face?

• 9. Is there anything more you wish to say?

Appendix B

Experts’ Talk

B.1 Conversation with Eva Marie Althoff Schäfer

After obtaining authorization from the other party to the conversation, a recording

of the conversation between Eva Marie Althoff Schäfer and the Author was made

and added to the report.

• 1. What is the title of your position/job?

• Ans: International Co-ordinator

• 2. Are you currently working on anything that would alter the management

system used to verify international students’ domestic degree completion?

• Ans: Yes and No, We continuously working on how to make more efﬁcient

the veriﬁcation process and we are working as a team to process and handle

and evaluate international students.

• 3. What value would you place on the existing system’s toolkit and ﬂexibility

for successfully implementing new technology?

• Ans: We don’t have any toolkit until yet, but we have been considering the

fact that some other universities uses UKNaric a veriﬁcation system for inter-

national students degree evaluation.

• 4. What additions or modiﬁcations would you make in light of previous

incidents?

• Ans: We always want to make sure to ﬁnd the right candidate. When we

evaluate any degree certiﬁcate, we carefully look the identity attribute with

relation to their passport and certiﬁcate and try to ﬁnd any dissimilarity that

contradict of what they say about themselves in the academic records.

86 Appendix B. Experts’ Talk

• 5. Which solutions would you choose and why if you were in charge of a

company looking to integrate veriﬁcation systems into their products?

• Ans: Well, DTU uses UKNaric but we still until my knowledge not using

any system but except based on our experience and skill we try to ﬁnd best

candidate for the study place.

• 6. Which ones would you choose not to utilize, and why?

• Ans: Sometimes when we are not sure of any institution in the following

countries, we go back to their website and try to ﬁnd something that we can

rely but again it is based on experience but not with assurity.

• 7. What factors do you believe are critical when evaluating a system for

implementing Veriﬁable Credentials/academic records?

• Ans: Name, date of birth and other identiﬁable attribute i think its important

when evaluating.

• 8. What do you believe are the most prevalent issues that today’s institutional

solutions face?

• Ans: Time. It takes tremendous amount of time to evaluate one candidate.

• 9. Is there anything more you wish to say?

• Ans: We are trying to ﬁnd a better solution day by day, sharing our thought

with our colleagues to come up with new things that help us to easy our

procedure to evaluate international students academic records.

B.2 Conversation with Mr. Ziarat Hossain Khan

• 1. What is the title of your position/job?

• Ans: Admission Controller

• 2. Are you currently working on anything that would alter the management

system used to verify international students’ domestic degree completion?

• Ans: No, but quite few of times we have a discussion about it, specially when

it is time for admitting new students in the period.

• 3. What value would you place on the existing system’s toolkit and ﬂexibility

for successfully implementing new technology?

• Ans: Well, at least something online that we can trust and check more easily

without justifying for long.

B.2. Conversation with Mr. Ziarat Hossain Khan 87

• 4. What additions or modiﬁcations would you make in light of previous

incidents?

• Ans: We had face some incidents about students enrolling two degrees at the

same time in two different university, but after that the ofﬁce decided that it is

better if we kept students academic transcript to us until the student complete

his degree from our university. But it is not the case with our university

but most of university here Bangladesh do exactly the same. As because

we believe students cannot enroll other program without representing his

transcript.

• 5. Which solutions would you choose and why if you were in charge of a

company looking to integrate veriﬁcation systems into their products?

• Ans: Something like governmental records as in universal or at least us like

people in academic institution, some kind of collaboration between institu-

tion, it can be through educational board ministry or understanding between

universities that we can easily look up to students records.

• 6. Which ones would you choose not to utilize, and why?

• Ans: Calling in person of the other side. It is very difﬁcult and timely matter.

• 7. What factors do you believe are critical when evaluating a system for

implementing Veriﬁable Credentials/academic records?

• Ans: Most of the students come to us and ask recommendation letter that

they request to make it in envelope with seal and closed so that the foreign

university can open as a ﬁrst time manner. Similarly sometimes we also have

to attested or re modify the transcript in case of loss and go through entire

record of the students that we believe need to change.

• 8. What do you believe are the most prevalent issues that today’s institutional

solutions face?

• Ans: Most of the time, forgeries are not that prevalent in our university, since

it is not national/governmental university but privatise company so students

here most of time have no competition to enroll except the money that they

have to pay. The thing most of time we face is the query from students and

other organization that seems to get answer back after long time since we are

not enough staff to perform all activities beside our prioritize job.

• 9. Is there anything more you wish to say?

• Ans: We have been excited to see something changes in veriﬁcation system,

and also worried of how to adapt the system fastly when living with not yet

but least technology we have.

88 Appendix B. Experts’ Talk

B.3 Conversation with Mohammad Tanvir Hossain

• 1. What is the title of your position/job?

• Ans: I am in the HR department.

• 2. Are you currently working on anything that would alter the management

system used to verify international students’ domestic degree completion?

• Ans: We usually look through linkedin and some familiar recruiter also

works for us when we need to hire fresh graduate or other employee. But the

concept of SSI fascinate me, ofcourse.

• 3. What value would you place on the existing system’s toolkit and ﬂexibility

for successfully implementing new technology?

• Ans: Something like coursera, so if the school provide something like that,

our belief would become more strong and trustworthy.

• 4. What additions or modiﬁcations would you make in light of previous

incidents?

• Ans: When we interview new students or other individuals, we speciﬁcally

ask something about what he says in his portfolio and academic record. And

we have to justify from that if we can ﬁnd any disturbance.

• 5. Which solutions would you choose and why if you were in charge of a

company looking to integrate veriﬁcation systems into their products?

• Ans: If i had to choose, I would create a system that enlisted all record of a

students like degree certiﬁcate we get from Udemy online or coursera.

• 6. Which ones would you choose not to utilize, and why?

• Ans: the system that exist now. What I meant is that, we have to ﬁnd the

authenticity from a proﬁle which seems to be very much true than it usually

are.

• 7. What factors do you believe are critical when evaluating a system for

implementing Veriﬁable Credentials/academic records?

• Ans: Trust problem, may be it seems very important to me. I have to ﬁnd a

way to trust some other company if they says something about an applicant.

• 8. What do you believe are the most prevalent issues that today’s institutional

solutions face?

B.3. Conversation with Mohammad Tanvir Hossain 89

• Ans: Making duplicate certiﬁcate form other sources that falsiﬁed what the

applicant says about him. When we talk about background check with the

help of our colleague who happens to also studied form the same institution

runs a background check with his her sources and if we are satisﬁed or not,

i believe those are the critical issues that institution faces.

• 9. Is there anything more you wish to say?

• Ans: When hiring students we basically runs a skill test and especially pri-

oritize his skill development task record that are more easy to justify rather

that qualiﬁcation achievement.